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ABSTRACT 
 
FROM HARRY TO SIR HENRY: SOCIAL MOBILITY IN THE 17TH CENTURY 
CARIBBEAN 
John Robert Davis, M.A. American History 
Western Carolina University (April, 2015) 
Director: Dr. Charlotte Cosner 
 
During the 17th Century, the Caribbean saw an explosion in seaborne raiding. The most 
common targets of these raids were Spanish ships and coastal towns. Some of the men who went 
on these raids experienced degrees of social and economic mobility that would not have been 
possible in continental Europe. This was because the 17th Century Caribbean created an 
environment where such mobility was possible. Among these was a Welshman was known to his 
compatriots as Harry Morgan. By the end of his life, Morgan would become one of the most 
famous buccaneers in history, a wealthy sugar planter, the Lieutenant Governor of Jamaica, and 
a knight.  
No one is exactly sure of Morgan’s social status before he entered the Caribbean. 
Historians largely agree that he was born to a freeholding family in Wales, although some 
dissenters contend that Morgan entered the Caribbean as an indentured servant. From either 
position, he experienced a high degree of social and economic mobility through his raids against 
the Spanish Empire and the conventional businesses that those raids funded. His life does not 
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represent the way that social or economic mobility worked for a typical buccaneer. What it does 
represent is the best case scenario for an individual who came to the Caribbean and engaged in 
buccaneering. Morgan utilized his raiding as a means to fund more conventional business 
interests such as sugar planting. This paper argues that the Caribbean provided a unique political, 
economic, and military atmosphere for an individual to climb the social and economic ladder 
from Harry Morgan, a common buccaneer, to Sir Henry Morgan, Lieutenant Governor of 
Jamaica and Admiral of Buccaneers.  
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INTRODUCTION: SIR HENRY MORGAN, ADMIRAL OF BUCCANEERS AND 
LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR OF JAMAICA 
 
Henry Morgan was famous for his bold attacks on shipping and towns along the Spanish 
Main. His exploits include sacking the Spanish ports of Panama,1 Maracaibo, and Portobello, 
attacks which would not have been possible in Europe and were direct challenges to European 
military and diplomatic arrangements. He was given to “damning and cursing upon the smallest 
provocation” and known for his inability to “abstain from company, drinking and sitting up 
late.”2  Despite his humble beginnings as a part of a buccaneering community, the name Henry 
Morgan would go down in history not as a pirate or buccaneer. Most of Morgan’s 
contemporaries remembered him as Sir Henry Morgan, Lieutenant-Governor of Jamaica and 
Admiral of Buccaneers. For a man of Morgan’s social class to rise to such positions of power 
and honor required a special set of circumstances unimaginable in 17th century Europe. This was 
especially true when combined with his reputation as a buccaneer, an occupation for those living 
on the fringes of society, and his low social and economic status upon entering the Caribbean.3 
The social, political, and military situation in the Caribbean allowed individuals a greater degree 
of social mobility than in Europe.  
The idea that the Caribbean was a unique region where Europeans inhabited spaces 
separate from European societal norms is not new. One can trace this argument to Richard 
Dunn’s concept that the Caribbean lay “beyond the line”.4 That is to say, that when one entered 
                                                           
1 Modern-day Panama City, Panama.  
2 Cyril Hamshere, The British in the Caribbean (Harvard University Press, 1972), xii. 
3Hamshere, The British in the Caribbean, xii. 
4 Richard Dunn, Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in the English West Indes, 
1624-1713 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1972), 11. 
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the region, the doctrine of effective occupation became far more important than formal treaty 
agreements and international law. Dunn’s argument, however, has been largely limited to 
European diplomatic relations. This work’s purpose is to illustrate that Dunn’s “beyond the 
line”5 idea extends beyond diplomatic history and into the realm of social mobility, using Henry 
Morgan’s life as a case study.  
For around two hundred years after the Spanish first settled in the New World, English, 
French, and Dutch colonists waged an “unholy crusade”6 against Spanish towns and merchant 
fleets.7 This constant state of violence would play a major role in determining colonial 
supremacy in the Caribbean for the next two hundred years. The undeclared war between 
Europe’s colonial powers in the Caribbean would also create a means to attain wealth and social 
mobility for those willing to take respectability at the tip of a sword just like they would any 
other prize. This thesis will argue that Henry Morgan was just such a man. He took advantage of 
the loosely sanctioned violence in the Caribbean, made possible by the Caribbean’s distance 
from European metropoles, to climb the English social ladder. The unique military, political, and 
social environment of the Caribbean made it possible for men, like Henry Morgan, with no title, 
fortune, or route to respectability to rise to positions of power and authority. More importantly, 
these men could achieve respectability, and even nobility, through means that were less than 
noble.   
                                                           
5 Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, 11. 
6 Hamshere, The British in the Caribbean, xi.  
7 Hamshere, The British in the Caribbean, xi. 
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One of the less than noble means through which many individuals sought wealth and 
social mobility was through seaborne raiding. These raiders could take three different forms- 
pirates, buccaneers and privateers. Historians have referred to Morgan as a member of all three 
groups. A full historiographical discussion of these terms will follow, however it is critical to 
note that describing an individual by one of these terms speaks volumes about an author’s 
argument and that these terms are not interchangeable. Although the lines dividing these groups 
were permeable and often unclear, they signify three distinct sections of Caribbean society.  
For purposes of this study, the major common factor between pirates and buccaneers was 
their tie to seaborne raiding. One may distinguish a pirate from a buccaneer by examining the 
way in which each group lived apart from their raiding. Pirates would visit established port cities 
and conduct business there. They may have also had business and political relationships with 
government officials. In contrast, Buccaneers were essentially members of maroon colonies who 
occasionally took to seaborne raids to support their communities. Privateers are the easiest of the 
three to distinguish. They possessed a document, issued by one of Europe’s colonial powers, 
called a letter of marque, which allowed them to attack an enemy nation’s ships and settlements. 
Essentially, privateers were government sanctioned pirates.  
Before beginning a historiographical discussion of where this work lies in current 
historiography, it is important to understand the life events of its central figure. Historians may 
only speculate as to the exact time and place of Henry Morgan’s birth. Most argue that he was 
born in Wales to a freeholding farm family in about 1635.8 He came to the Caribbean and began 
                                                           
8 Burgess, The Pirates’ Pact, 36.; Richard Frohock, Buccaneers and Privateers: The Story of the 
English Sea Rover, 1675-1725 (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2012), 51.; David 
Cordingly, Under the Black Flag: The Romance and Reality of Life Among the Pirates (New 
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a career of buccaneering as a member of the Brethren of the Coast. Morgan gained fame, wealth, 
and a title of nobility working as a privateer. Under a letter of marque from Sir Thomas 
Modyford of Jamaica, Henry Morgan led bands of men, most of whom belonged to buccaneer 
communities in Jamaica, Tortuga, or Hispaniola, on raids against Spanish towns at Puerto 
Principe9, Portobello, Maracaibo, and Panama.10 These raids formed the platform from which 
Henry Morgan attempted to climb the English social ladder. 
While Sir Thomas Modyford sanctioned these raids as governor of Jamaica, Charles II of 
England did not approve of them. Morgan would spend 1672 through 1674 in London under 
arrest for raiding the Spanish Empire during a time of peace. However, he would return to 
Jamaica as Sir Henry Morgan, lieutenant governor of Jamaica.11 While Morgan possessed the 
trappings of the Jamaican upper class, the island’s planters did not accept the former buccaneer 
into their ranks. Henry Morgan’s life represents the ways in which the Caribbean could facilitate 
social mobility for individuals of all classes, but also that this mobility had limits.  
The foundational work on social class in the Caribbean is Richard Dunn’s Sugar and 
Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in the English West Indies, 1624-1713. Dunn argued that 
the Indies lay “beyond the line,”12 meaning that European treaty agreements did not apply there. 
While the great colonial powers of Europe may have been at peace on the continent, the 
                                                           
York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1995), 44.: Peter Earle, The Sack of Panama: Sir Henry 
Morgan’s Adventures on the Spanish Main (New York: Viking Press, 1981), 58. 
9 Puerto Principe is a Spanish town in Cuba.  
10 Earle, The Sack of Panama, 40, 68, 226.  
11 Earle, The Sack of Panama, 237. 
12 Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, 11. 
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Elizabethan Wars continued in the New World, unchecked by treaty or international law. The 
concept that international law was more of a guideline in the West Indies led to a “might is 
right”13 mentality among the great powers in the Caribbean. The English, French, and Dutch 
would freely occupy unclaimed territory in the Indies, if they had the strength to do so. Likewise, 
the Spanish would suffer no international repercussions for driving other European colonial 
powers from the New World, if they could muster the necessary force.14  
Dunn argues that English colonists in the Caribbean lived in an area where European 
class distinctions applied, but not the social norms that accompanied those distinctions.15  He 
states that English settlers in the Caribbean “robbed and massacred each other more freely than 
the rules of civility permitted in European combat.” According to Dunn, violence not only 
manifested itself in the form of combat in the Caribbean, but in the form of labor management. 
The same men who “robbed and massacred” each other also “exploited their black and Indian 
slaves more shamelessly than was possible with the unprivileged laboring class in Western 
Europe.” Additionally, Dunn asserts that the English Caribbean bred a rougher existence than 
Europe or Virginia. 
 In “Changing Identity in the British Caribbean: Barbados as a Case Study,” Jack P. 
Greene has argued that, as seventeenth-century British colonists in the Caribbean were coming to 
terms with their new social, economic, and environmental spaces, they also became “active 
                                                           
13 Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, 11. 
14 Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, 11. 
15 Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, 12. 
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agents in changing them, in creating new social landscapes.”16 While Greene’s case study is 
limited to Barbados, his argument applies to the larger British Caribbean. In the same way that 
Dunn represented international law as a more of a guideline than a hard and fast rule in the West 
Indies, Greene has argued that social class was subject to the same loose interpretation in the 
Caribbean. Greene argues that distance from the metropole, and the necessities of survival in the 
face of ever present military threats made social class more porous in the Caribbean than it was 
in Europe.17 While social mobility was not easy to obtain anywhere in the European world, it 
was much less elusive in the Caribbean.  
As their title suggests, Carl and Roberta Bridenbaugh’s No Peace Beyond the Line: The 
English in the Caribbean, 1624-1690 affirms Richard Dunn’s concept of the West Indies as a 
place where European colonists perceived treaty arrangements and class barriers in shades of 
grey.18 Unlike Dunn, the Bridenbaughs give a geographic definition of what lies “beyond the 
line.”19 According to them, this region is “the boundless area west of the longitude of the 
outermost of the Azores and south of the Tropic of Cancer.”20 This will serve as the geographic 
definition for this term throughout this study.  
                                                           
16 Jack P. Greene, “Changing Identity in the British Caribbean: Barbados as a Case Study,” in 
Colonial Identity in the Atlantic World, 1500-1800, ed. Nicholas Canny and Anthony Pagden 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 213.  
17 Greene, “Changing Identity in the British Caribbean” in Canny and Pagden Colonial Identity, 
214-215. 
18 Carl and Roberta Bridenbaugh, No Peace Beyond the Line: The English in the Caribbean, 
1624-1690 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), 3.  
19 Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, 11. Bridenbaugh and Bridenbaugh, No Peace Beyond the Line, 3.  
20 Bridenbaugh and Bridenbaugh, No Peace Beyond the Line, 3. For purposes of this study, the 
author will apply this geographic definition for what lies “beyond the line.” 
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The Bridenbaughs claim that the Caribbean’s unique environment enabled men like 
Henry Morgan to leave Wales as the son of a farming family in 1650, and emerge from “beyond 
the line,”21 “a rich man, lieutenant-governor, commander in chief of the forces of Jamaica—and 
also a knight.”22 The Bridenbaughs do not argue that Morgan’s success was the norm. They are 
careful to note that many European immigrants to the Caribbean did not achieve anything like 
this level of success. What they do argue however, is that the new social spaces that English 
colonists in the Caribbean created “beyond the line”23 allowed social mobility for those with the 
skills, audacity, and luck to take advantage of them.24  
 Dunn, Greene, and the Bridenbaughs all argue that the long distance from London 
allowed new social, political, economic, and military models to develop in the British West 
Indies. The extreme distances between West Indian colonies and their European metropoles 
created an environment where social, political and economic barriers were less rigid than in 
Europe. The desperate clamor for military might in these colonies allowed individuals with 
innovative ideas at the tactical and operational levels of military thinking to advance along the 
social ladder in ways unimaginable in European society. These studies all argue that the 
seventeenth-century Caribbean represented a unique social, political, and military space separate, 
but connected to, the great European metropoles. This thesis will extend this argument into the 
realm of social mobility, using Henry Morgan’s life as a case study and revealing how the 
Caribbean acted as a vehicle for social mobility in the 17th century.   
                                                           
21 Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, 11. 
22 Bridenbaugh and Bridenbaugh, No Peace Beyond the Line, 110.  
23 Bridenbaugh and Bridenbaugh, No Peace Beyond the Line, 3. 
24 Bridenbaugh and Bridenbaugh, No Peace Beyond the Line, 3, 110.  
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The Caribbean’s distance from European metropoles played another important role in 
creating an atmosphere conducive to upward social mobility. The three thousand miles of ocean 
between Europe and the New World not only separated the Caribbean from European treaty 
arrangements and barriers to social mobility, but also from European military forces. The 
massive distance between European naval forces and the Caribbean colonies and supply lines 
that they needed to protect created a fertile hunting ground for pirates, buccaneers, and 
privateers. These groups preyed upon vulnerable Spanish shipping in the Caribbean, as well as 
coastal Spanish cities.  
Philip Ainsworth Means’ work, The Spanish Main: Focus of Envy, 1492-1700 expresses 
one of the primary reasons that the Caribbean was a breeding ground for piracy and privateering 
ventures. Means uses the term “Spanish Main” loosely, to refer to the “entire Caribbean Sea and 
the Southern half of the Gulf of Mexico, together with the islands in those waters and the 
mainland adjacent thereto.”25 Referring to the Spanish Main as the “focus of envy” is fitting. 
This term expresses the idea that the Spanish Main was more than a geographic region. It was the 
Spanish Empire’s lifeline. Spain tasked the majority of its Caribbean military force with 
defending this highway of gold and silver from the New World to Spain. Likewise, attacking this 
line of supply was the way in which Europe’s other colonial powers concentrated their resistance 
to Spanish military and economic dominance.26  
                                                           
25 Philip Ainsworth Means, The Spanish Main: Focus of Envy, 1492-1700 (New York: Gordion 
Press, 1965), vii.  
26 Means, The Spanish Main, vii.  
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Spain’s difficulty defending this supply line is the central theme of Alejandro de la 
Fuente’s Havana and the Atlantic in the Sixteenth Century. British and American historians’ 
works have focused on the ways in which the English defended their possessions and took 
advantage of Spanish weakness. De la Fuente, a Cuban historian writing in English, has focused 
on the Spanish side of this problem. In his study of seventeenth-century Havana, de la Fuente 
discussed how the violence that permeated the sixteenth and seventeenth-century Caribbean led 
to the Spanish Flota or “fleet” system. The massive treasure fleets that comprised the Flota 
system would assemble in Havana harbor to wait out hurricane season. When the turbulent 
Caribbean weather permitted, they would depart for Spain laden with gold and silver from the 
Peruvian and Mexican mines. De la Fuente also argued that the massive size of the Flota made it 
necessary for the Spanish to build large, well-defended port cities. Portobello, Cartagena, and 
Havana served as way points for the Flota during its long journey across the Caribbean. These 
cities helped to secure safe passage for the treasure fleets, but were also rich targets for English, 
French, and Dutch pirates, buccaneers, and privateers.27   
Other scholars have also discussed the difficulties the Spanish faced in defending their 
treasure fleets and port cities. In The Spanish Crown and the Defense of the Caribbean 1535-
1585 Precedent, Patrimonialism and Royal Parsimony, Paul E. Hoffman argued that while the 
Spanish made a valiant effort at defending their West Indian possessions, their task was 
unfeasible. The weather and winds of the Caribbean, as well as the sheer size of Spain’s New 
World empire made the task of defending so much treasure difficult if not impossible. Like de la 
Fuente, Hoffman focuses his work from the Spanish perspective of this problem, not on how the 
                                                           
27 Alejandro de la Fuente, Havana and the Atlantic in the Sixteenth Century (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 2008) 
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English, French, and Dutch capitalized on the vulnerable Spanish treasure fleets, and the port 
towns in which they were housed when not at sea.28     
 Together, these works argue that while the Spanish Empire made strong attempts at 
defending their wealth from foreign incursion, the task was insurmountable. Many Spanish 
outpost colonies did not have the manpower to defend themselves against an attack by 
concentrated English forces. This lack of manpower, combined with the expenses involved in 
maintaining the fortifications and equipment necessary to defend the empire, created a prime 
hunting ground for unconventional military forces bent on looting the Spanish. Innovative 
military thinkers like Henry Morgan and Sir Francis Drake gained fame, wealth, and elevated 
social status by taking advantage of difficulties in defending the Spanish Empire’s mineral 
wealth. While the Spanish military held responsibility for defending the Spanish Main, they 
faced the daunting task of fighting an unconventional enemy, namely seaborne raiders, with 
conventional forces. Also, in a conflict such as existed in the seventeenth-century Caribbean, 
perceptions of victory were different for each set of combatants. From the Spanish perspective, 
any ship or town lost to privateers, buccaneers, pirates, or her enemies’ regular navies was 
unacceptable. To her enemies, any successful attack on Spain’s Empire was a tremendous 
accomplishment.  
 Historians are divided on the distinctions between buccaneers, pirates, and privateers. 
This confusion reflects the various terms primary sources employ when referring to individuals 
engaged in these pursuits. It mattered little to the Spanish what class of seagoing enemy re-
                                                           
28 Paul E. Hoffman, The Spanish Crown and the Defense of the Caribbean, 1535-1585, 
Precedent, Patrimonialism, and Royal Parsimony (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University 
Press, 1980), 3, 7.  
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appropriated their goods. Likewise, the English Crown did not lose sleep when pirates, 
buccaneers, or privateers plundered Spanish shipping. However, making a clear distinction 
between these groups is important to understanding social mobility. During the seventeenth-
century, membership in each of these groups carried different degrees of social respectability. 
Individuals hoping to achieve upward social mobility, like Morgan, faced the task of navigating 
the murky waters that separated these groups.  
The next few pages contain a chronologically organized discussion of the definitions 
other historians provide for these terms. There exists a myriad of definitions assigned to the 
terms pirate, privateer, and buccaneer in both primary and secondary sources. This variance in 
terminology reflects a wide swath of authors attaching different connotations to these terms to 
better serve the purposes of their respective works. Additionally, the confusing ways in which 
current historians use these terms reflects the numerous definitions that 17th and 18th century 
sources assigned to the words pirate, privateer and buccaneer. Following the discussion of other 
historian’s definitions of these shifting terms, the next paragraphs will offer a working definition 
of pirates, privateers and buccaneers for purposes of this study.  
In his 1965 work The Age of Piracy, Robert Karse has asserted that the Caribbean was 
uniquely suited to piracy and privateering. According to Karse, the massive Spanish treasure 
fleets were “slow and clumsy”29 and they were “too easy to miss in the confined waters around 
the Antillean islands.”30 His work also looked at the difficulty of navigating the thin, permeable 
line between pirates, buccaneers, and privateers, citing cases such as Francis Drake and John 
                                                           
29 Robert Karse, The Age of Piracy (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1965), 11. 
30 Karse, The Age of Piracy, 11.  
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Hawkins. Many men built an identity based on the ease with which they could traverse the line 
between pirate and privateering. Karse referred to individuals such as Drake and Hawkins as the 
“Queen’s Pirates.”31 Karse differed the most with Peter Earle and other scholars discussed in this 
section when he called Henry Morgan a pirate rather than a privateer or buccaneer. Karse 
referred to Morgan as the captain of a pirate ship, instead of using the tile “Admiral of 
Buccaneers” 32 that Governor Sir Thomas Modyford commissioned Morgan, or as a privateer, as 
Earle referred to Morgan. 33 Karse reserves the title of privateer for men like the brothers Woodes 
and John Rogers.34 
In the 1977 work The Buccaneer King: The Biography of Sir Henry Morgan, Dudley 
Pope argues that it is most accurate to refer to Henry Morgan as a pirate.35 However, Pope 
occasionally refers to Morgan as a “buccaneer”36 and by his title of “Admiral.”37 Pope’s decision 
to call Morgan a pirate stems from Pope’s view that Morgan’s association with the Brethren of 
the Coast as the main component of Henry Morgan’s identity. Buccaneers would take to the sea 
to sack a Spanish town without a letter of marque, whereas, the men that Karse referred to as the 
“Gentlemanly Privateer”38 were restricted to only acting under the orders of a letter of marque. 
Pope identifies Morgan as a pirate rather than a privateer because of his continued association 
                                                           
31 Karse, The Age of Piracy, 15. 
32 Earle, The Sack of Panama, 155. 
33 Karse, The Age of Piracy, 16.; Earle, The Sack of Panama, 155. 
34 Karse, The Age of Piracy, 16.; Earle, The Sack of Panama, 155. 
35 Dudley Pope, The Buccaneer King: The Biography of Sir Henry Morgan (New York: Dodd, 
Mead and Company, 1977), 263.   
36 Pope, The Buccaneer King, 263.  
37 Pope, The Buccaneer King, 188. 
38 Karse, The Age of Piracy, 16. 
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with buccaneers as well as his heavy drinking and womanizing.39 This treatment of Morgan as 
well as the Brethren of the Coast is complicated. While Pope identifies the Brethren of the Coast 
as buccaneers, he bases his decision to classify Morgan as a pirate on Morgan’s association with 
the Brethren.  
In his 1981 work The Sack of Panama: Sir Henry Morgan’s Adventures on the Spanish 
Main, Peter Earle agrees with Dunn’s “beyond the line”40 concept. In this military history of 
English privateers’ exploits against the Spanish Main, he discusses the relationship between 
legalized plunder of the Spanish colonies and the limited capability that English settlements, 
such as Jamaica, had of defending themselves against Spanish, French and Dutch naval attacks. 
Earle’s work illustrates the important role that privateers played in defending English colonies in 
the English Navy’s absence. He calls the political environment of seventeenth-century West 
Indies the “lunatic world.”41 This refers specifically to how Governor Sir Thomas Modyford of 
Jamaica was once forced into a de facto declaration of war against the Spanish Empire in order 
to maintain a large enough privateer fleet to defend his island against the French.42 While the 
French were the main military threat to Jamaica, private men-o-war were not willing to offer 
their services to king and country without permission to hunt lucrative Spanish prizes. More 
generally, this statement describes the diplomatic and military nightmare that individuals like Sir 
Thomas Modyford faced in defending English colonies. This “lunatic world” created an 
environment where Henry Morgan’s transformation from buccaneer to titled gentry was possible.  
                                                           
39 Pope, The Buccaneer King, 137.  
40 Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, 11. 
41 Earle, The Sack of Panama, 25.  
42 Earle, The Sack of Panama, 24-25.  
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Carl Swanson’s definition of a privateer in Predators and Prizes: American Privateering 
and Imperial Warfare, 1739-1748 further complicated the process of defining privateers and 
pirates. He defined an English privateer by the stipulations set forth in a 1739 set of sixteen 
guidelines for issuing letters of marque. These instructions stipulated what ships were eligible 
prizes and the manner in which prizes were to be adjudicated. According to Swanson, these rules 
intended to classify English privateers as an extension of the Royal Navy. They required private 
men-of-war43 to give aid to all English ships in distress or under attack by an enemy, and granted 
the right to claim prizes to officers in the Royal Navy, as well as private men-of-war.44 These 
royal guidelines that Swanson used to distinguish between pirates and privateers already existed 
as part of an unwritten code of behavior in use by seventeenth-century privateers. Although they 
were only officially codified 1739, Morgan and his contemporaries would have operated (at least 
ostensibly) under an unwritten code of operations similar to these rules.  
Jennifer Marx states, in Pirates and Privateers of the Caribbean, that, “whether they 
were outlaw pirates, buccaneer ‘Brethren of the Coast,’ or privateers carrying letters of marque, 
which made them legitimate in the eyes of the issuing authority, mattered little to the Spaniards,”  
the most likely victims of acts of piracy or privateer attacks.45 Marx subscribes to the idea that 
the label of pirate or privateer lay in the eye of the beholder. To the victims of attacks at sea, the 
political affiliation of the attacker carried little meaning. Whether one’s shipping was being 
                                                           
43 This term refers to private vessels outfitted for war engaged in raiding enemy towns, or 
shipping.  
44 Carl E. Swanson, Predators and Prizes: American Privateering and Imperial Warfare, 1739-
1748 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), 32-35.  
45 Jennifer Marx, Pirates and Privateers of the Caribbean (Malabar, Florida: Krieger Publishing 
Company, 1992), 1.  
15 
 
looted by a privateer, land-based buccaneer, or a sea-roving pirate made no difference to the 
individual footing the bill for such losses. The Spanish Crown suffered the same financial losses 
if its ships fell prey to privateers, buccaneers, common pirates, or the English, French or Dutch 
navies.   
Kris E. Lane’s Pillaging the Empire: Piracy in the Americas, 1500-1750, also 
acknowledges the difficulty associated with discerning piracy from privateering or normal acts of 
war. He writes that “Defining piracy, as these examples suggest, has always been 
problematical,… always plastic in the manipulative hands of nationalist historians.”46 While 
Lane does draw a distinction between privateer and pirate, he makes it clear that the victims of 
privateer or pirate attacks rarely recognized this distinction. He points to examples of Piet Heyn, 
Francis Drake and Henry Morgan to illustrate this point. All of these individuals were considered 
heroes in their own nation, but mere pirates by the Spanish Empire.47   
At this point, it is appropriate to establish a working definition of the terms pirate, 
privateer, and buccaneer used in this study. The term buccaneer originated with marooned 
Frenchmen on the island of Tortuga, who were famous for the method by which they cured meat 
obtained by hunting the wild cattle and pig herds that inhabited the island.48 This term enters the 
realm of this study when these men took to the sea to attack Spanish shipping and towns. 
Members of buccaneer communities would shift between hunting wild cattle and pigs, and 
                                                           
46 Kris E. Lane, Pillaging the Empire: Piracy in the Americans, 1500-1750 (London: M.E. 
Sharpe, INC, 1998), xvi.  
47 Lane, Pillaging the Empire, 4-6.  
48 C.H. Haring, The Buccaneers in the West Indies in the XVII Century (Hamden, Connecticut: 
Archon Books, 1966.), 67.  
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hunting Spanish treasure as each individual saw fit.49 It is fitting to describe buccaneers as part 
time pirates. Buccaneers often held occupations other than maritime robbery. Individuals who 
engaged in buccaneering often supplied passing merchant and military vessels with meat, naval 
stores and other provisions, but would occasionally take to sea to attack lucrative shipping 
targets. These individuals existed on the bottom rung of the Caribbean social ladder, living 
outside of civil society.50 
Pirates, on the other hand, were individuals who chose to attack Spanish shipping as their 
primary means of supporting themselves. The biggest difference between pirates and buccaneers 
was that pirates had no connection to the cow hunting or other land-based occupations that 
defined the lives of buccaneers not actively engaged in raiding. This is not to say that pirates did 
not have other occupations. The ranks of pirate crews expanded and contracted with the political 
winds in the Caribbean. Many pirates started out as merchant sailors or held other unskilled labor 
professions in the Caribbean. One may distinguish a pirate from a privateer in two ways.  
First, a pirate held no sanctioning document or letter of marque from a colonial power 
authorizing the ship’s company to engage in raiding against a belligerent power’s shipping. 
Pirates acted of their own accord as seaborne thieves when choosing to take a Spanish, English, 
Dutch, or French ship as a prize. The second distinguishing characteristic of a pirate from a 
privateer is the matter of who owned the vessel in question. Privateers crewed ships known as 
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“private men-o-war.”51 These vessels belonged to an individual owner, or a private company, 
hence the name “privateer”, and were licensed one nation to attack another nation’s shipping. By 
virtue of the illegal nature of pirate crews, a pirate vessel had no clear, legal, owner. Many ships 
engaged in piracy were stolen, or had fallen victim to a mutinous crew. The owner of the ship 
was whoever happened to be serving as captain at a particular point in time.52  
Although the term privateer is the most clear of the three, it is still difficult to define. 
Simply put, privateers functioned as government sanctioned pirates. Douglass R. Burgess 
describes colonial governors hiring pirates to act as “surrogate navies”53 in his work, The 
Pirates’ Pact: The Secret Alliances Between History’s Most Notorious Buccaneers and Colonial 
America. Burgess uses the term pirate in this sentence to make the point that the men colonial 
governors in the British New World hired to serve as privateers were going to engage in 
seaborne raiding with or without a letter of marque. However, when individuals accepted a letter 
of marque from a royal governor, they were no longer pirates, but privateers. For purposes of this 
study, a privateer is defined as any individual engaging in commerce raiding at land or sea under 
the license of a letter of marque.    
While the theoretical definition of a privateer was clear, this clarity did not extend into 
the everyday lives of pirates and privateers. A thin, permeable line divided the ranks of pirates 
and privateers. Privateers, buccaneers, and pirates all sought to profit by attacking merchant 
ships at sea. However, unlike common pirates or buccaneers, privateers held a license, issued by 
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one nation, to attack ships of another nation. This license was called a letter of marque. The fact 
that sailors on privateering vessels swelled the ranks of pirate ships during times of peace, and 
pirates would often offer their services as privateers during times of war illustrates that the line 
between privateer and pirate was purely a legal construction. The actions carried out by pirates 
and privateers were nearly identical. The only major difference between the two groups was 
whether or not an individual carried a letter of marque. At times the difference between 
privateering and piracy depended on nothing more than the day of the week. If a privateer took a 
prize on the wrong side of a peace treaty, he became a pirate, the privateer’s ignorance of the 
treaty notwithstanding.54 While privateers’ actions were sanctioned by their own governments, if 
a private man-o-war fell prisoner to the nation whose ships she attacked, her captors would view 
the actions of her crew as common piracy. The letter of marque that a privateer carried mattered 
little if he were captured.55  
 Chapter One of this thesis will examine the way that buccaneers, one of the three types of 
seaborne raiders in the Caribbean, negotiated the ways in which they became a part of European 
empires. Examining Henry Morgan’s life provides a lens through which historians may view 
these negotiations. Morgan occupied a unique position in Jamaica’s political system. As a 
member of the Brethren of the Coast and a buccaneer leader, he facilitated an alliance between 
buccaneer communities in Jamaica, Tortuga, and Hispaniola, and the English colonial 
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government in Jamaica. However, Morgan also held political authority in Jamaica. He was in 
charge of Jamaica’s defenses and eventually held the title of lieutenant governor.56  
 Chapter Two looks at Henry Morgan and Sir Thomas Modyford’s arrests following the 
Sack of Panama in 1671. This raid represented the high-water mark of the Anglo-buccaneer 
alliance in the Caribbean. In raiding Panama during a time of peace, Modyford and Morgan 
managed to challenge the peace in Europe based on their actions in the Caribbean. Although 
Charles II ordered both men arrested, the terms of their arrests show that the idea of “no peace 
beyond the line”57 was still alive and well. Charles II’s minimal punishments for these men 
illustrate that the Caribbean was still a separate space where European powers could fight each 
other for dominance without challenging the peace on the Continent. Additionally, Morgan’s 
celebrity reception in London represents the ways in which this separate space could facilitate 
social mobility. The English capital received Morgan like a national hero, and he returned to 
Jamaica in 1674 after two years in England as a knight, and lieutenant governor of the island.58  
 The final chapter explores the problems Morgan faced upon his return to the Jamaica. 
Although Morgan had escaped punishment for attacking the Spanish Empire during peacetime, 
his buccaneer past would not allow him to fully enjoy the status that his title and political power 
should have provided him. While Morgan possessed celebrity status, and associated with certain 
members of Jamaica’s political and social elite, the planter class did not accept the former 
buccaneer as one of their own. This chapter will also examine the ways in which Morgan found 
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his place in Jamaica’s upper class after his death. While Jamaica’s planter class may have not 
been fond of the direction in which Morgan guided the colony’s development, they paid their 
respects to him after his death.  
 Sir Henry Morgan’s life represents a superb lens through which to view social mobility in 
the 17th century Caribbean. From 1668-1671, he used attacks against the Spanish Empire to 
elevate himself from the position of rowdy buccaneer leader to lieutenant governor of Jamaica.59 
Morgan’s raids may have gained him riches, fame, political power, and title, but the fact that he 
perpetrated these raids in the manner of a buccaneer would not allow him enter the hearts and 
minds of Jamaica’s planter class as an equal. Morgan’s rowdy lifestyle, reminiscent of his 
buccaneer days, would dominate how Jamaica’s upper class perceived Morgan throughout his 
life.  
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CHAPTER ONE: MEN WITH NO NATION 
 Three qualities defined Caribbean buccaneers in the mid-17th century. First, their 
communities acted in an anational manner. Individual buccaneers may have hailed from any of 
Europe’s great colonial powers, but many did not identify themselves as belonging to any of 
these empires.60 Second, they did not display the same degree of racial and class divisions that 
dominated relations in the major colonial powers. While buccaneering communities were not 
bastions of racial equality or classless societies, many members (including high-level members) 
of these communities were former slaves and indentured servants.61 Third, buccaneers 
maintained a state of constant conflict with the Spanish Empire. This fighting could manifest 
itself in defensive actions to protect buccaneer settlements in places like Hispaniola and Tortuga, 
or as instances of seaborne raiding.62 Buccaneers in the 17th century saw the Spanish Empire 
both as their most feared adversary, and as their access to the greater Atlantic World and its 
wealth of consumer goods.  
 English, French, and Dutch officials knew the levels of damage that seaborne raiding 
could inflict upon an enemy’s economy. Many of these individuals felt a righteous desire to 
challenge Spanish dominance in the New World. A 1690 pamphlet by London merchant Sir 
Dalby Thomas expressed the feelings of many officials in England relating to Spanish 
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domination of West Indian trade. Thomas questioned the “unaccountable negligence, or rather 
stupidity” of English rulers who had not challenged Spain’s claim to the New World earlier. He 
argued that Englishmen should not “sit still and see the Spanish rifle and plunder and bring home 
undisturbed, all the wealth of that golden world.”63 This attitude encouraged Englishmen in 
many parts of the New World to challenge Spain’s dominance in the West Indies. Additionally, 
English colonial governors like Sir Thomas Modyford of Jamaica rarely possessed regular naval 
forces at their disposal. A lack of a uniformed, nation-funded naval force made the prospect of a 
surrogate navy comprised of buccaneers all the more appealing.64 
These same officials had seen the effects of Piet Hein’s 1628 attack on the Spanish 
treasure fleet near Matanzas Bay, Cuba. This attack resulted in Spain losing that year’s supply of 
gold and silver to the Dutch.65 Memories of Sir Francis Drake’s 1573 raid on Panama still fueled 
English imaginations and Spanish nightmares.66 Closer to home, English privateers had 
destroyed most of the French fishing fleet in 1549, jeopardizing much of France’s food supply.67 
These examples illustrated how effective these types of raids could be.68 
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Buccaneering communities rarely raided non-Spanish shipping and coastal towns, 
making them a minimal threat to English, French or Dutch shipping.69 They also provided 
European monarchs with a level of plausible deniability when their subjects crossed lines of 
acceptable behavior. When Sir Francis Drake raided Spanish shipping and coastal towns in the 
16th century Caribbean, England’s Elizabeth I denounced Drake’s actions when corresponding 
with Spanish diplomats. In private, however, she was a major stockholder in the enterprise. 
Despite the advantages that buccaneering attacks and privateers offered, they did not act as the 
professional, surrogate navies that many European leaders imagined.70 Instead of acting as a 
naval militia, early privateers and buccaneers acted in their own interests with little concern for 
their sovereign’s.  
 Just as European governments realized that buccaneer communities were not the 
surrogate navies that they desired, members of buccaneering communities realized that they 
could gain some clear advantages from allying themselves with a European power. One 
advantage that buccaneers obtained by allying themselves with the English, in common 
opposition to the Spanish Empire, was that they gained a degree of legitimacy by becoming 
privateers. Buccaneers were not pirates, but English, Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, and French law 
subjected them to trial and execution as pirates if colonial authorities captured buccaneers during 
a raid. Letters of marque from this period illustrate the benefits of operating as a privateer. Henry 
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Morgan’s 1670 letter of marque from Governor Sir Thomas Modyford promised him, “all the 
assistance this island (Jamaica) can give you.”71 
No one understood the difference between the legal actions of privateers and the illegal 
actions of pirates and buccaneers better than Sir Henry Morgan. As lieutenant-governor of 
Jamaica in 1682, he oversaw the executions of three men convicted of piracy for actions against 
the Spanish. These very same types of actions had earned Morgan nobility, wealth, and fame just 
a few years earlier.72 Obtaining a letter of marque from colonial governors in Jamaica entitled 
buccaneers-turned-privateers to reciprocal aid from English and allied vessels. Privateering also 
entitled former buccaneers to the security of English and allied ports, and freedom from 
prosecution for piracy in English and allied courts for the types of actions they already 
conducted.73  
 Allying themselves with European governments would change buccaneering 
communities forever. No longer would they possess the anational character that defined them for 
the first part of the 17th century. However, members of buccaneer communities would gain some 
important advantages from this alliance. For individuals like Sir Henry Morgan, this alliance 
would lead to elevated social and economic status. For the vast majority of other buccaneers, 
alliance with a European power would mean little more than a change in job title.74 They would 
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become privateers, operating under a letter of marque that gave them immunity from prosecution 
as pirates in courts of the issuing nation or any allied nations for actions against that nation’s 
enemies.75 Buccaneers’ skill as raiders and seamen gave them the ability to negotiate the terms of 
their community’s transfer from anationality to colony.  
Morgan’s life is important to this story not because he was the first buccaneer to ally 
himself with a European empire, but because his attacks on Portobello and Panama represent the 
high water mark of anational buccaneering communities working alongside European powers in 
mutually beneficial actions. Before Morgan’s raids on Portobello and Panama, buccaneers 
tended to act as members of anational communities. Buccaneer communities would occasionally 
ally themselves with a European power, but it was not a common occurrence. After Morgan’s 
raids, buccaneer communities routinely sacrificed their anational character for the security of 
privateer’s licenses and a safe port to sell captured Spanish goods and ships.76 As Marcus 
Rediker argues in Villains of all Nations: Atlantic Pirates in the Golden Age, many individual 
buccaneers turned to piracy and maintained their anational identities.77 However, for 
buccaneering communities as a whole, the economic and physical security of associating with 
European empires outweighed the advantages of retaining their anational existences.  
 Members of buccaneering communities in the 17th century Caribbean often did not 
identify themselves as subjects of one of Europe’s great colonial powers. While those living in 
English settler colonies certainly did not operate as part of mainstream English society, they 
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possessed greater cultural and political ties to the metropole than individuals in buccaneering 
communities.78 Many of these communities possessed an international population that 
complicated efforts to assimilate these communities into European empires. Bartolomeo el 
Portugues, Rock the Brazilian, and Henry Morgan, all claimed membership in Jamaica’s 
buccaneer community, but hailed from Portugal, Holland, and Wales, respectively.79 Buccaneer 
communities on Tortuga and Hispaniola possessed a similar international makeup.80 These 
communities did not possess a homogenous nationality, or a dominant nationality like many 
settler colonies. In buccaneer communities, international populations led to anational identities.  
 Religion was often a more important identifier for these groups than nationality. The 
Spanish referred to buccaneers from Tortuga as “Protestant pirates” or “los corsarios 
luteranos.”81 This referenced the Protestant religious zeal that served as a secondary motivation 
for many early buccaneering voyages against the Catholic Spanish Empire. Conversely, Irish 
Catholics led many of the early Spanish-sponsored raids against Protestant British82 buccaneers. 
One Irishman known only as Murphy led an attack on Tortuga. Another named Philip Fitzgerald 
led a 12 gun warship out of Havana with the goal of exterminating Protestantism in the New 
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World. Neither attack experienced a large degree of success, but they still illustrate what Jack 
Beecher describes this religious identity as a “supra-national loyalty that cut both ways.”83  
 For many years after buccaneers began allying themselves with European empires, they 
continued to act in a limited anational manner. For example, Sir Thomas Modyford of Jamaica 
sanctioned Henry Morgan’s 1688 attack on Portobello, and 1671 attack on Panama. This made 
these acts clear privateering ventures under an English license.84 However, French buccaneers 
comprised a significant number of this expedition’s compliment. According to Exquemelin, 
Morgan’s call to arms roused more buccaneers than Morgan had room to carry on his ships. 
Many of these individuals hailed from the island of Tortuga, a haven for buccaneers, but 
nominally a French colony.85 
 Buccaneering communities exhibited a greater degree of racial and class equality than 
their settler colony counterparts. Alexander Exquemelin notes that during Henry Morgan’s raid 
on Maracaibo, his buccaneers refused to ransom a slave who had collaborated with them. 
Morgan’s men feared that the Spaniards would have “burnt him alive if they could have laid 
hands on him.” This slave later became a member of Morgan’s crew. Morgan’s men turned 
down the ransom money for this individual in order to reward his contribution to their 
enterprise.86  
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 This may seem like a self-serving tale on the part of Exquemelin. He was present at the 
raid and felt the need to justify his participation. Before writing off this tale as a participant’s 
attempt at personal redemption, remember that Exquemelin was no friend of Morgan’s. In The 
Buccaneers of America, Exquemelin took every available opportunity to disparage Morgan’s 
name. This was particularly the case when it came to telling of atrocities that Morgan and his 
buccaneers perpetrated. Morgan even sued the English-language publishers of Exquemelin’s 
book for libel. Although Morgan only received £200 of the £10,000 in damages he requested, the 
court still found Thomas Malthus’ reproduction of Exquemelin’s work libelous.87  
When buccaneers took to the sea to engage in raids, individuals of all races and social 
classes formed the crews of their vessels. The ways in which buccaneer crews made decisions 
aboard ship and divided the spoils of raids speaks to the racial and class equality of these 
communities. Before Henry Morgan set out to attack Panama, he held a conference to determine 
the command structure of his fleet and the ways in which the expedition would divide the spoils 
of their raids. Recognizing his role as organizer, the expedition voted Morgan overall 
commander. Typical buccaneer custom would dictate that these discussions take place in a 
general council of the entire expedition, but considering the large size of the fleet, only ship 
captains and squadron commanders participated in this particular meeting. However, the council 
was only able to make recommendations to the expedition as a whole to meet with the approval 
or disproval of the entire expedition. Final decision-making power lay in the hands of the 
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expedition as a whole, and in the conscience of each individual buccaneer, who could participate, 
or walk away as he saw fit.88 
 Importantly, buccaneers did not distribute these additional shares based upon class or 
racial distinctions. Buccaneer expeditions were not egalitarian ventures. Certain individuals did 
received a greater share of plunder than others, but these extra allotments recognized services 
these individuals performed during a venture. Ship captains received eight individual shares in 
addition to their own. Surgeons received two-hundred additional pieces of eight for furnishing 
their medicine chests. Carpenters earned an extra one hundred pieces of eight for furnishing their 
tools. Individuals who displayed “extraordinary gallantry”89 also received additional spoils. The 
first to raise the English flag over a fort received fifty pieces of eight, a man who took a prisoner 
who yielded valuable intelligence would receive an extra two-hundred pieces of eight. 
Grenadiers received an extra five pieces of eight for each of their grenades that landed in an 
enemy fort. Morgan’s crew also laid out a number of compensations for individuals wounded in 
battle.90 
Surgeons, carpenters, and individuals who performed well in battle received additional 
loot because of their contributions to the expeditions, not because of their elevated social or 
economic classes. Ship captains did receive eight additional shares of the loot, but instead 
Morgan’s expedition earmarked these shares for care of their ships. Captains merely 
administered these extra funds. When giving a general description of the ways buccaneers went 
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about outfitting their expeditions Exquemelin remarked that, “The captain is allowed no better 
fare than the meanest on board. If they notice he has better food, the men bring the dish from 
their own mess and exchange it with the captain’s.”91 The only individual that received a 
disproportionate share of wealth from the raid on Panama based on his position was Morgan 
himself. The expedition voted him a share of one one-hundredth of the entire expedition’s 
plunder, a disproportionate share in a crew of over 400 men, as organizer of the venture.92 
Like any other member of the crew that drew a larger share than his shipmates, Morgan’s 
disproportionate share of the wealth reflected his contribution to organizing the expedition. This 
was no easy task. Morgan operated under a letter of marque from the English governor in 
Jamaica.93 This may have aided his efforts at recruiting in Jamaica’s buccaneer community, but 
not communities that leaned toward other empires like Tortuga and Hispaniola. Once Morgan 
formed his forces, he had to create a command structure that appeased members of an 
international and interfaith community. The crew of this venture voted him this share of the 
expedition’s profit in recognition of his contributions to the expedition.94  
Although Morgan’s share was larger than that of any other member of his expedition, it 
was significantly smaller than those that individuals in similar positions would collect in the 
future. Royal Navy captains received three eights of the prize once the British government 
allowed them to profit from their duties. This was a common rule of thumb for private men-of-
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war as well during the mid-1700s.95 Morgan’s small share of his expedition’s wealth reflects the 
democratic and less class oriented society of the buccaneer communities. Even in this instance 
where a council of ship captains determined treasure allotment, Morgan’s share of the wealth 
was significantly smaller than future leaders would receive.  
While buccaneer crews may have divided loot from raids without much regard to class or 
race, buccaneer communities were not bastions of racial and class equality. Many of the same 
buccaneers that would take their captain’s food if they thought it was better than their own 
owned slaves. Indentured servitude was also rampant among their ranks, Alexander Exquemelin 
was an indentured servant on the island of Tortuga and he accuses Henry Morgan of having been 
an indentured servant upon entering the Caribbean. Exquemelin writes of buccaneers treating 
their indentured servants with abnormal cruelty.96 When discussing the way that the hunters of 
Hispaniola treated their indentured servants he writes, “These men are cruel and merciless to 
their bondsmen: there is more comfort in three years on a galley than one in the service of a 
boucanier.”97 Members of buccaneer communities did not make the transition from anationality 
to colony without an understanding of European class and racial divisions, but they did exhibit a 
greater degree of social and economic mobility than their counterparts in settler colonies.  
Many buccaneers, including Sir Henry Morgan, owned plantations and slaves.98 Enslaved 
Africans in buccaneer communities fared little better than their counterparts in European settler 
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colonies.99 However, free blacks in buccaneer communities did not experience the same types of 
social and economic barriers as those in European settler colonies. They also gained greater 
acceptance and equality in the hearts and minds of the white populations of buccaneer 
communities than did free blacks in European settler colonies. Henry Morgan’s last days provide 
evidence of this. Throughout his life he was a heavy drinker, and his lifestyle caught up with him 
in 1687. Dr. Hans Sloane, Morgan’s physician tells us that Morgan, “consulted a black 
doctor.”100 While this may have been the desperate action of a man on his deathbed, it still 
represents an equality of the heart that would have been uncommon outside of the buccaneer 
community.101  
 The alliance between buccaneers and the English in Jamaica benefitted both parties. 
Members of buccaneering communities gained some degree of legitimacy and security by 
becoming privateers. The English utilized the buccaneer communities on Tortuga, Jamaica, and 
Hispaniola as fertile recruiting grounds for a surrogate navy. Buccaneers not only possessed the 
skills of seamanship required in a surrogate navy, but they knew how to sail, plan, and fight as a 
fleet. For better or worse, the practices that buccaneers employed in raids changed very little 
after they began associating themselves with the English colonial government.   
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Henry Morgan’s capture of Maracaibo is a prime example of the ways in which English 
patronage did little to change the ways in which buccaneers squeezed Spanish communities for 
treasure. Association with the English Crown did nothing to curb the cruelty with which 
buccaneers extracted wealth from their captures. When Morgan’s forces landed at Maracaibo, 
they found it abandoned except for a man that Alexander Exquemelin described as a “poor 
ignorant simpleton.”102 When ordered to show the buccaneers the town’s wealth, the man led the 
buccaneers to the church sacristy, but the citizens of Maracaibo had taken all of the valuables 
from the church with them when they fled. This made the buccaneers think that their guide was 
“a rich man pretending to be a fool.”103  
The lack of plunder in the town enraged Morgan’s forces. They tied the old man to a tree 
and tortured him until he claimed that his name was Don Sebastian Sanchez, the brother of the 
governor or Maracaibo. He then led his tormentors to the place where he kept his “goods and 
money.”104 This turned out to be nothing more than a hovel where the man had buried a few clay 
pots and three pieces of eight. At this revelation, the buccaneers tortured the man anew. They 
bound him, hung stones from his neck and feet, and burned palm leaves under his face while 
beating him. The man lived through thirty minutes of these tortures before succumbing to 
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death.105 Ironically, Henry Morgan, the leader of this expedition, claimed to “abhor 
bloodshed”106 during his tenure as lieutenant-governor of Jamaica.  
These brutal tactics were nothing new to members of buccaneer crews. Long before 
buccaneers began associating themselves with the English Crown, they utilized similar methods. 
Period accounts describe one buccaneer captain known as Rock the Brazilian, as so cruel as to 
make other buccaneers cringe. Exquemelin relays stories of this captain spitting Spaniards on 
wooden stakes and roasting them alive for refusing to show him the road to a town.107 A French 
buccaneer named Jean-David Nau (referred to often as “Francois L’Olonnais, once “tore the 
living heart out of his (a prisoner’s) body, gnawed at it, and then hurled it in the face of one of 
the others.”108  
Buccaneer atrocities stand as a superb example of Richard Dunn’s “beyond the line”109 
idea. Dunn argued that the Caribbean bred a rougher existence than Europe or North America. 
Stories of buccaneers support this statement. These individuals lived in a boom and bust 
economy. A successful raid could take them from the edge of starvation to the lap of luxury in a 
month’s time. Although stories of epic debauchery litter buccaneer legends, these events stood in 
contrast to the very real fear of starvation that many buccaneer crews faced. The quest for food 
was a prime factor in many decisions aboard a buccaneer ship. Buccaneers seeking to provide a 
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steady food source for their ship would take Spanish turtle fishermen prisoner off of the coasts of 
settlements such as Bayamo. These men would catch sea turtles and prepare the meat for the 
buccaneers. Many captive turtle fishermen would not be able to return to their homes for periods 
of nearly five years if a buccaneer crew happened to capture them.110 Many barbarous acts 
attributed to buccaneer crews occurred after long periods at sea with little food. These types of 
acts, and the rewards that accompanied them, would not have been possible in Europe.  
For example, Edward Mansveldt was a Dutch buccaneer from Jamaica who raided into 
New Granada and the South Sea. The threat of starvation cut short his lucrative 1667 raids 
against the Spanish. Rock the Brazilian and his crew experienced similar bouts of hunger during 
raids. In one instance, he and his men captured a Spanish ship but found it lacking provisions for 
their coming journey. Poor supply forced the buccaneers to attack a Spanish cavalry force on 
Campeche in order to supplement their diets with horsemeat from captured Spanish horses. 111 
Eating horsemeat is not a surprising course of action for men in a survival situation. This episode 
is notable because these buccaneers actively sought battle with a superior military force in order 
to acquire horsemeat.      
If association with the English Crown did little to decrease the buccaneers’ brutality, it 
did even less to change the military tactics these fierce fighters employed during their raids. One 
of the reasons that the European powers welcomed buccaneer crews as surrogate navies is 
because they were a cost effective method of expanding a nation’s naval power. This was due to 
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the fact that buccaneer crews were skilled, ingenuitive, and bold raiders. These men had 
employed irregular naval and amphibious forces in concert to loot Spanish coffers, and maintain 
their anational independence long before associating themselves with any nation. Once 
buccaneer communities began alliances with European empires, they put these same skills to 
work for king and country.  
Buccaneering ventures experienced high degrees of success from their earliest days. 
Despite repeated attacks from Spanish forces, the buccaneer communities on Tortuga and 
Hispaniola survived for many years before allying themselves with the French.112 These 
communities fought for their very existence against Spanish invasions and extermination gangs 
sent to harass parties of buccaneers that hunted wild cattle and pig herds.113 When members of 
these communities took to the sea to raid Spanish shipping, they took the skills that they learned 
fighting the Spanish and hunting wild boar and cattle with them. Superior marksmanship and the 
ability to fight as a cohesive unit, skills that they learned hunting, served them well as raiders.  
Exquemelin speaks of buccaneers holding marksmanship contests where they would 
attempt to shoot oranges off of a tree by nicking the stem with a single bullet.114 Whether or not 
Exquemelin exaggerated the marksmanship skills of the buccaneers, they possessed a distinct 
tactical advantage in the areas of marksmanship and rate of fire over their Spanish enemies by 
virtue of practicing with their weapons much more often.115 This would have been a nearly 
impossible feat with the smoothbore muskets of the late 17th century. Andrew Roberts, a student 
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of Napoleonic Warfare, estimates that as late as 1815, aimed musket fire only possessed a five 
percent accuracy rate past ten yards.116 Even with the more advanced weapons of the early 19th 
century, shooting fruit off of trees by the stem represented a nearly impossible feat.  
At this point it is appropriate to point out the tactical, operational, and strategic reasons 
that buccaneering ventures against the Spanish Empire were so successful. At first glance, the 
Spanish seem to have all the military advantages. They funded their defenses with a constant 
flow of hard specie from their gold and silver mines in Peru and Mexico, they operated the 
largest naval force in the Caribbean, and housed troops in fixed fortifications. Many Spanish 
towns housed a garrison of professional soldiers in addition to a local militia that trained at least 
on a monthly basis. Buccaneers seeking to raid these communities faced a daunting task.117  
Seaborne raiders, of all types, possessed some important advantages that become 
apparent when analyzing the strategic, operational, and tactical environment of the 17th century 
Caribbean more closely. First, while the Spanish Empire as a whole may have been very strong, 
every individual town was not. The Spanish Crown considered the entire New World, and 
particularly the Caribbean, its own private fiefdom. This attitude emerged from Pope Alexander 
VI’s Papal bulls that declared the New World an “Iberian sphere of influence.”118 This mentality 
began to change early in the colonial period, but would endure into the early 19th century. The 
Spanish recognized Portuguese claims to the Brazilian Coast in the 1507 amendments to the 
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1496 Treaty of Tordesillas. However, Spain would not recognize claims to any other part of the 
New World from any Christian monarchs until the 1697 Treaty of Ryswick.119 The Spanish 
Crown felt that the Pope and New World leaders such as the Aztec leader Montezuma had 
donated the entirety of the New World to Spain in a method reminiscent of the Donation of 
Constantine.120 This position required that the Spanish Crown defend the entirety of the 
Caribbean from the English, French, and Dutch whom Spanish officials considered interlopers.  
A number of scholars have discussed the difficulties that the Spanish faced in defending 
their New World possessions and supply lines. Works like Philip Ainsworth Means’ The Spanish 
Main: The Focus of Envy, 1492-1700, Alejandro de la Fuente’s Havana and the Atlantic in the 
Sixteenth: Century, and Paul E. Hoffman’s The Spanish Crown and the Defense of the Caribbean 
1535-1585 Precedent, Patrimonialism and Royal Parsimony argue that the Spanish took great 
pains to repel seaborne raiders and conventional military forces, but that the task was 
insurmountable.121 Means describes the Spanish Main as “The Focus of Envy.”122 There could 
not be a more appropriate term. The treasure fleets that carried gold and silver from the New 
World to Spain constituted the lifeline of the Spanish Empire. As Anthony Padgen argues, 
Europeans viewed the West Indies as “places where they might secure for themselves goods and 
a way of life which they could never have hoped to acquire at home.”123 Likewise, seaborne 
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raiders could not have dreamed of a more lucrative target. The same is true for the port cities like 
Portobello that housed trade goods and treasure on its way to Havana. Buccaneers focused their 
efforts at obtaining upward social and economic mobility through raids against Spain’s Empire.  
These cities and fleets were daunting, but not impossible targets for attacks by raiders of 
all kinds. Patience, preparation, and daring paid huge dividends for those looking to plunder 
Spanish coffers. By the time that buccaneer crews began associating themselves with European 
governments, these individuals had acquired extensive knowledge of the routes that Spanish 
ships traveled. They knew what times of the year these vessels would be fully laden, and in 
vulnerable positions. Additionally, buccaneers could make intelligent guesses as to when 
merchants or treasure fleets visited coastal Spanish towns. This meant that these towns would 
have been full of treasure or trade goods when buccaneers struck. Buccaneers would plan their 
attacks on Spanish settlements and shipping at times when these attacks would yield high returns 
with the least amount of risk.124 
Overcoming Spanish defenders during a raid was all about having a higher concentration 
of firepower in a specific moment than the defenders could absorb.125 While Spanish defenders 
typically possessed greater numbers of heavy weapons, and fired from prepared defensive 
positions, buccaneers could deploy their forces in such a way as to neutralize this advantage. 
Buccaneer crews prided themselves on their skill with small arms. When attacking an enemy 
ship or defensive position, most buccaneer captains considered four men with muskets the 
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tactical equal of one heavy cannon.126 In such an attack, the goal was to kill the gun crew rather 
than destroy the weapon. This also saved the gun so the buccaneers could move it to their ship, if 
feasible.  
In certain situations, raiders would attack a ship or defensive position under the cover of 
darkness. This minimized the threat that Spanish cannons posed to the raiders. Darkness did not 
reduce the effectiveness of the attackers’ heavy weapons, however, because they were firing 
against immobile positions. Fighting after dark, when most defenders were asleep, also reduced 
the speed with which the Spanish could muster the local militia to bolster a town’s defenses. In 
this situation, raiders faced the minimum number of defenders, and neutralized the effectiveness 
of the defenders’ heavy weapons.127  
Buccaneers were no strangers to ruse and subterfuge. In the face of superior firepower, 
buccaneers often had better luck using innovative tactics to overcome defenders rather than 
relying on superior training. Henry Morgan’s escape from Lake Maracaibo is a superb example 
of the daring and cleverness that made many buccaneering ventures rousing successes. After 
sacking the town of Maracaibo, Morgan attempted to sail to the open sea with his small fleet and 
the plunder he had gathered taking the town. However, he found three Spanish warships 
guarding the mouth of the lake and that Spanish forces had re-occupied the fort overlooking the 
entrance to Lake Maracaibo. The most heavily armed ship in Morgan’s fleet only carried 
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fourteen guns, while the Spanish possessed a forty-eight gun ship and two smaller vessels 
mounting thirty and twenty-four guns respectively.128  
In order to make his escape, Morgan fitted one of his vessels as a fire ship and ordered it 
to attack the Spanish flagship. His fleet sailed toward the mouth of the lake with the fire ship in 
the lead, disguised as a man of war. The fire ship’s crew grappled itself to the forty-eight gun 
Spanish ship, causing the larger vessel to catch fire. The two smaller ships ran for the safety of 
the Spanish fort. One ran aground in the hasty retreat, after which, the buccaneers easily captured 
the other. Morgan’s men then attempted to assault the fort, but the Spanish defenders repulsed 
them.129   
This presented Morgan with a new challenge. His heavy guns were not sufficient to 
breach the fort’s walls, and his men had proven unable to take the fort by storm. He prepared a 
ruse that would allow him and his men to sidestep the fort and escape Lake Maracaibo with all 
their treasure. Morgan sent several canoes full of men to act as if they were a landing party 
intending to attack the fort under cover of darkness. When the canoes returned to the ships, 
however, all but a few of these men lay flat on the bottom of the vessels to make the Spanish 
think an attack from the land side of the fort was imminent. This caused the Spaniards to shift all 
of their artillery to the landward side of the fort. When darkness fell, the buccaneers weighed 
anchor and allowed their ships to drift with the tide so as not to rouse suspicion. When they 
reached the mouth of the lake, they raised full sails and made haste away from the fort. The 
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Spanish managed to move a few guns to the seaward side of the fort but not before the 
buccaneers made a clean escape to the open sea.130  
The irregular tactics and cruelty that buccaneers showed to their Spanish enemies were 
markers of their anational origins and the fact that they lived in a world “beyond the line.”131 
These were not the tactics of regular armies or navies, but of individuals who raided more 
powerful enemies for trade goods and infusions of hard currency. While the latter part of the 17th 
century may have seen buccaneers act under the guise of nationalism, the ways in which these 
individuals fought harkened back to an anationalistic existence. This identity predated their 
association with Europe’s great colonial powers.  
Early buccaneering historian and Royal Navy Captain James Burney gave a poignant 
description of the relationship between buccaneers and European nations other than Spain, 
“More Europeans, not Spaniards, consequently allies of the buccaneers, continued to pour into 
the West Indies.”132 Following the principle that non-Spanish immigrants to the Caribbean held 
common cause with buccaneering communities, the English colonial government in Jamaica, and 
the French government in Tortuga made efforts to incorporate these communities into their 
efforts to challenge Spanish dominance in the Caribbean. This would transform the buccaneering 
community in profound ways. By allying themselves with the English Crown, buccaneers lost 
parts of their anational character. Most became a part of the greater British world, or scattered 
and became pirates. Others attached themselves to another of Europe’s colonial powers.  
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Even the concept of the buccaneer as a part-time pirate would disappear after the end of 
the 17th century. Professional privateers with ships purpose-built for commerce raiding would 
become the new surrogate navies of Europe’s colonial powers.133 Never again would buccaneers 
exist as an independent, anational community in the Caribbean. Although buccaneers lost their 
political and cultural autonomy after allying themselves with the English, they used their position 
as skilled, independent fighters, to negotiate the terms on which they would enter, or remain 
apart from, British society.  
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CHAPTER TWO: “THAT DRUNKEN, SILLY PARTY OF SIR H. MORGAN’S”134 
 
In The Name of War: King Phillip’s War and the Origins of American Identity, Jill 
Lepore argues that 17th Century New England colonists’ “Englishness had been compromised”135 
by their decision to adopt certain Native American ways of living. She extends this argument, 
contending that the brutality of conflicts such as King Phillip’s War further alienated colonists 
from their Englishness.136 Wayne Lee also examines violence in Crowds and Soldiers in 
Revolutionary North Carolina: The Culture of Violence in Riot and War. He argues that the “end 
goal of public violence plays the critical role in shaping the violence.”137 Although these two 
studies take place in the English North American colonies, their arguments are relevant to ways 
in which individuals like Henry Morgan achieved limited amounts of social mobility in the 17th 
Century Caribbean. Morgan received a title of nobility, a formal marker of social advancement, 
but never fully integrated into Jamaica’s planter class. 
While Lepore argues that Englishmen in the Plymouth Colony lamented losing their 
Englishness to the American wilderness. This was not the case with many 17th century 
buccaneers. These individuals existed in anational communities despite Spanish attempts to wipe 
them from the Caribbean, along with English, French, and less aggressive Dutch desires to build 
strong empires in opposition to the Spanish. Buccaneers lived anationally because they wanted 
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to, not out of necessity. Conversely, buccaneer communities became a part of European empires 
because doing so gave buccaneers limited immunity from prosecution as pirates, and greater 
access to the Atlantic World’s wealth of consumer goods. Associating with European empires 
allowed buccaneers to acquire letters of marque, making them privateers. It also gave them 
access to stable markets where they could sell captured goods and spend captured money. Only 
after many former buccaneers integrated into European colonial society did they begin to 
concern themselves with legitimacy and social status. Within a buccaneer community, a 
buccaneer leader was a legitimate member of society. When those communities became 
intertwined with European colonial society, buccaneer leaders like Henry Morgan, found their 
rowdy pasts an obstacle to social mobility.  
As Lee contends, the way in which individuals perpetrated violence dictated the 
legitimacy of their actions. Henry Morgan is a prime example of how this idea presented itself in 
the 17th century Caribbean. He, like countless other buccaneer leaders, participated in a number 
of barbarous acts during his time raiding the Spanish Empire. Morgan achieved a much higher 
degree of social mobility than other buccaneer leaders, and social requirements of the day 
demanded that he present his actions in manner befitting an individual of his status. Before 
discussing the ways in which Henry Morgan and Sir Thomas Modyford justified their military 
actions in the Caribbean through the language of legitimate violence, it is important to 
understand the types of actions they performed. It is equally crucial to understand the reasons 
that members of the 17th century Jamaican planter elite considered these actions less than 
legitimate.  
After Morgan’s early successes at raiding the Spanish Empire and bringing other 
buccaneers into the service of the English government, Governor Sir Thomas Modyford gave 
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him the title of Admiral of Buccaneers in 1668. Modyford also placed Morgan in command of 
Jamaica’s defenses. This title and assignment gave Morgan the authority to command regular 
naval forces as well as Jamaica’s privateer fleet. Morgan becoming an admiral marked an 
important point in his social climb. He was a former buccaneer, but was now able to command 
ships of the Royal Navy.138 
Defending Jamaica from European enemies was a tall order, seeing that Modyford had no 
regular naval forces at his disposal.139 In the “lunatic world”140 that was the 17th century 
Caribbean, defending Jamaica from feared Spanish, French, and Dutch incursions took 
innovative military thinking. The most creative innovation came on March 4, 1666 when Sir 
Thomas Modyford and the Council of Jamaica resolved that “it is the interest and advantage of 
the island of Jamaica to have letters of marque granted against the Spaniard.”141 It mattered little 
to Modyford that Spain and England had agreed to cease hostilities in the Caribbean with 
Charles II’s return to the throne in 1660. Morgan was not yet in command of Jamaica’s defenses, 
nor was he a part of the decision to issue letters of marque against the Spanish Empire during this 
time of peace, but this decision would have profound effects on his life.  
On June 29, 1670, Henry Morgan assumed command of Jamaica’s military forces. The 
newly-appointed admiral inherited a difficult situation. As Peter Earle argues, buccaneers would 
fight the French or Dutch only in self-defense, but would actively pursue conflict with the 
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Spanish.142 This was a logical position. Buccaneers raided in order to infuse their local 
communities with hard specie, and trade goods. The Spanish Empire was the richest source of 
these goods in the Caribbean. Therefore, the most effective way to gather a fleet of buccaneers 
was to offer them commissions to raid the Spanish Empire. In 1666, Modyford had provided the 
incentive for a buccaneer fleet. Morgan’s task was to determine the best way to utilize this fleet 
to act in Jamaica’s defense. There was no economic incentive for buccaneers to remain near 
Jamaica to engage in any type of defensive action. Additionally, buccaneers did not crew 
dedicated warships in this period. They fought with what ships they could capture or purchase. 
Maintaining a standing fleet of buccaneers therefore was as impossible as it was ineffective. 
Buccaneers did not fight in the same way as a regular naval force or an amphibious militia. They 
attacked their enemies using speed and daring, not superior firepower and overwhelming force.  
In a conflict against Spanish, French, or Dutch warships, an English buccaneer fleet 
would have been all but useless. The ships comprising the buccaneer fleet did not possess the 
armament necessary to fight a line-ahead battle with regular naval forces.143 While buccaneers 
had defended their communities in the past against Spanish forces, these actions pitted 
buccaneers against Spanish forces sent to attack buccaneer communities and hunting parties, not 
large-scale invasion fleets.144 Had the Spanish, French or Dutch attempted to retake Jamaica, 
their forces would have been much more numerous and better armed than the ones buccaneers 
had repulsed in the past.  
                                                           
142 Earle, The Sack of Panama, 50. 
143 Exquemelin, The Buccaneers of America, 76. 
144 Exquemelin, The Buccaneers of America, 32. 
48 
 
Morgan’s actions against the Spanish at Portobello, Maracaibo, and Panama (1668-1671) 
constituted the most effective way he and Modyford could have used of the forces at their 
disposal.145 While Morgan only carried the title of admiral for the Panama raid, his actions at 
Portobello and Maracaibo illustrate the same type of strategic thinking on the parts of Morgan 
and Modyford. They realized that a fleet of buccaneers were poorly suited to defensive actions, 
so they used the raiders in an offensive manner to prevent the Spanish from being able to gather 
enough forces to attack Jamaica. By attacking Spanish settlements, Morgan created a situation 
where Spanish commanders would not come to each other’s aid for fear of leaving their own 
towns poorly defended.146 This served to spread Spanish defenses to a breaking point and, more 
importantly, prevent the Spanish from attempting to retake Jamaica.  
Evidence of how effective this strategy was comes from Morgan’s raid against 
Portobello. While Morgan held the city of Portobello hostage, the Spanish Army of Panama 
attempted to rescue it. But when its commander and interim President of Panama Don Augustin 
de Bracamonte, attempted a rescue of the city, they discovered that Morgan’s French147 allies 
were no longer with him. Bracamonte feared that this was an attempt to lure the Army of Panama 
to Portobello and leave Panama unguarded and open to the French contingent. Maestre de 
Campo Juan de Salina, the commander of Bracamonte’s advance guard expressed the 
predicament in which the Spanish Army found itself. “We find ourselves today with just eight 
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hundred men, inexperienced and poorly armed people who, man for man, are not the equal of 
their enemies. These men are the only defence of this Kingdom and so all of Peru… I consider it 
impossible for us to recover Portobello and its castles.”148 As de la Fuente, Hoffman, and Means 
have argued, Spanish forces in the Caribbean were spread too thin to mount an effective defense 
of their supply lines.149  
Morgan and Modyford’s strategy prevented the Spanish from mounting any real threats 
against English Jamaica, however, Charles II of England had not sanctioned any of Modyford’s 
de facto declarations of war against the Spanish. Just as Spanish diplomats protested Sir Francis 
Drake’s raids to Elizabeth I, their 17th century counterparts demanded satisfaction from Charles 
II for Morgan and Modyford’s actions. Modyford was no friend of pirates, raiders that attacked 
English or allied targets as well as Spanish ones. Shortly before Morgan’s raid on Portobello, he 
condemned three pirates to the gallows for attacking English ships. However, in the tradition of 
Sir George Carey’s 1585 declaration, he followed the thinking that, “her Majesty shall not need 
to espy the faults of those that will venture on their own to do her service.”150 Plundering English 
shipping constituted piracy, but looting the Spanish Empire was privateering.  
This idea served Modyford well within the Caribbean. It allowed him to defend his 
colony from foreign invasion, and turn a tidy profit for himself and Charles II.151 For example, 
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Morgan’s raid against Portobello earned nearly 125,000 pieces of eight for the Crown. However, 
it placed the English in a difficult position in European diplomacy. Typically, when Europe’s 
great colonial powers fought each other in the Caribbean, the conflicts stayed in that region.152 
However, Morgan’s raids against Portobello and Panama proved too much for the Spanish to 
ignore. From the Spanish perspective, these were not limited attacks on remote coastal towns. 
These two raids constituted a serious threat to Spanish economic security and territorial integrity 
in the Caribbean. In a letter to Charles II, England’s Ambassador to Spain could not “describe 
the effect of this news upon Madrid.”153 Spain’s queen led her capital city in a period of 
“uncharacteristically bleak mourning” by falling to her knees in prayer and staying there for 
hours. 154 This was not the type of relationship that Charles II wanted to cultivate with his 
Spanish allies.  
Furthermore, Morgan was not a mere buccaneer seeking to gain hard currency for his 
local community. He carried the rank of Admiral in the English Navy, and a letter of marque 
from an English colonial governor.155 Spanish officials interpreted this as an English 
endorsement of Morgan’s actions. Small-scale English-sponsored attacks and even large-scale 
raids by buccaneers did not threaten the peace in Europe. Morgan and Modyford’s English-
sponsored buccaneer coalition accomplished just that. Luckily for English diplomatic efforts, 
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Spanish officials had no knowledge that a Royal Navy frigate, HMS Oxford, had been the 
intended flagship of the Maracaibo raid.156 
This type of clear threat to the peace in Europe demanded a response from Charles II. He 
authored a number of reprimands to Modyford, demanding that he recall all privateers and 
pirates. As Douglass Burgess argued, “The difference between illegal piracy and legal 
privateering might have been semantic to a Jamaican governor, but it was not so for an anxious 
king desperately trying to avert war with Spain.”157 Because of the intense diplomatic situation in 
Europe, Morgan and Modyford faced the necessity of justifying their actions to a sovereign 
making desperate attempts to keep peace on the Continent, and to those who considered their 
actions the epitome of corruption and lawlessness. They did so through their correspondence 
with each other and their superiors.  
Modyford’s instructions to Morgan pre-empting the Portobello raid gave the two the 
justification they needed to attack a rich Spanish target during a time of peace. Morgan’s 
commission read that he should, “draw together the English privateers and the prisoners of the 
Spanish nation, whereby he might inform [Modyford] of the intentions of that enemy to invade 
Jamaica.”158 In order to justify his attack against Portobello, Morgan sent a warning to 
Modyford. While sailing near Puerto Principe, Cuba, Morgan had heard rumors of a massive 
Spanish fleet massing near Portobello with intentions to make its way to Havana, and lead an 
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invasion of Jamaica.159 Such a direct threat to Jamaican security was the only possible way for a 
colonial governor to justify declaring war against Spain.  
 Morgan and Modyford justified the Panama raid in a similar fashion, but with important 
differences. Panama was one of Spain’s most important outposts, and the seat of Spanish 
colonial government in the region. Although the language that Morgan and Modyford used in 
justifying this attack still portrayed the Spanish Empire as a threat to Jamaica, they could hardly 
justify attacking a city on Panama’s Pacific coast as a defensive action. Rather, circumstances 
forced Modyford to feign ignorance to Charles II’s orders to recall the privateers and blame slow 
communications between England and Jamaica for dispatching Morgan to attack Panama.160  
 The important difference between the Panama raid and similar actions against Portobello 
and Maracaibo, was that Modyford deliberately disobeyed a direct order from Charles II in 
sanctioning this action. Morgan’s expedition to Panama left on December 18, 1670. Less than a 
week before Morgan’s departure, Governor Modyford received a letter from secretary of state 
Lord Arlington. Arlington’s letter stated that “His Majesty’s pleasure is that in what state soever 
the privateers are at the receipt of this letter you will keep them so til we have a final answer 
from Spain, with this condition… he obliges them to forbear all hostilities on land.”161 After 
receiving this letter, it was clear that any raid against a Spanish town would be in direct 
opposition to Charles II’s wishes. Despite their orders, Morgan and Modyford decided to 
continue with their plan.  
                                                           
159 Burgess, The Pirates’ Pact, 57. 
160 Burgess, The Pirates’ Pact, 59. 
161 Burgess, The Pirates’ Pact, 59. 
53 
 
Both the Governor and Admiral would claim later that Morgan had “unwittingly”162 
sailed against Panama against Charles II’s direct wishes. They noted the delay in communication 
between the New World and London, and claimed that they were unaware of the King’s order to 
cease hostilities with Spain before setting sail for Panama. Modyford would even claim that he 
had sent a fast ship to call Morgan back to Jamaica, but that it arrived too late to prevent the 
attack. This blatant lie would cost Modyford his position as governor and lead to both his and 
Morgan’s arrests.163  
These types of justifications littered correspondence between Modyford and his allies in 
Charles II’s court. For Caribbean governors of all nations, however, blaming the delay in 
transatlantic communication, or claiming to have a better plan of action than someone in Europe 
was common.164 The concept of, “obedezco pero no cumplo” (I obey, but do not comply) litters 
correspondence between Spain’s colonial governors and their sovereigns. This phrase indicated 
that a governor was still the loyal servant of his Catholic majesty, but that he was taking a 
different course of action based on a communications lag, or his own analysis of a particular 
situation. As Stanley and Barbara Stein argue in The Colonial Heritage of Latin America, 
contemporaries did not see this attitude as paradoxical, nor did they attempt to convey irony with 
this phrase. It was merely a way in which colonial officials expressed loyalty to their sovereign 
while blatantly disobeying his orders in order to suit local conditions.165  
                                                           
162 Burgess, The Pirates’ Pact, 62.  
163 Burgess, The Pirates’ Pact, 62. 
164 Burgess, The Pirates’ Pact, 53. 
165 Stanley J. Stein and Barbara H. Stein, The Colonial Heritage of Latin America: Essays on 
Economic Dependence in Perspective, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 74-75.  
54 
 
As this Spanish phrase illustrates, a colonial governor disobeying his sovereign was not a 
uniquely English problem, nor was Modyford more likely to do this than his counterparts in 
other colonies. The Panama raid crossed the line of acceptable disobedience for two reasons. 
First, the raid placed Charles II in a difficult diplomatic situation. Charles II had lived in exile in 
Catholic France and Spain for a number of years before the Restoration. Spanish and French 
officials considered this raid poor compensation for their hospitality.166 Also, raiding Panama not 
only expressed disobedience to a single order, but a blatant disregard for Charles II’s overall 
foreign policy, as well as a series of reprimands ordering Modyford to cease hostilities against 
Spanish territories.  
The king’s actions were swift, by 17th century standards. Spain’s ambassador to England, 
the Conde de Molina declared that to avoid a war, Modyford must go.167 In 1672, King Charles 
II dispatched Sir Thomas Lynch to Jamaica with orders to replace Sir Thomas Modyford as 
governor. Lynch was also to arrest Modyford and send him to England. “Contrary to the King’s 
express commands,” Modyford had, “made many depredations and hostilities against the 
subjects of His Majesty’s good brother the Catholic King.”168 He would receive a two-year stay 
in the tower of London for his actions.  
Although Modyford was technically imprisoned, his captors treated him as a gentleman 
for the duration of his sentence. After two years, he returned to London’s high society, and 
eventually sailed back to Jamaica to serve as the island’s chief justice.169 Importantly for the 
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buccaneers, and Morgan, Modyford’s arrest brought an end to the glory days of buccaneer 
patronage in Jamaica. From that point forward, privateers would act as a naval militia in the 
service of European power.170 Future officials, including Morgan, would punish individuals who 
attacked Spanish targets during peacetime just as if they had attacked an English target.171  
By the time Lynch left for Port Royal, Modyford and Morgan had attainted such 
popularity in Jamaica that Charles II’s orders to Lynch specified that he take possession of the 
fort guarding the city before attempting to relieve Modyford of his position.172 If arresting a 
bureaucrat would require such drastic action, Lynch could only imagine how difficult it would be 
to arrest Henry Morgan, the man Douglas Burgess described as “a folk-hero for every schoolboy 
and an inspiration for every out-of-work buccaneer.”173 To arrest Morgan and stem the tide of 
buccaneer raids, Lynch hatched a plot to systematically dismantle Morgan’s support within the 
Jamaican government. Lynch hoped that this would prevent a civil war within the colony when 
he attempted to arrest Morgan. While Lynch had the support of Jamaica’s planters, Morgan was 
a popular man among the lower classes and had many supporters among Jamaica’s political elite. 
Lynch eliminated Morgan’s support system by issuing a blanket pardon for all individuals who 
participated in raids against the Spanish, and by offering Morgan’s closest associates positions 
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within the new colonial government.174 It took nearly a year, but finally, Lynch eliminated 
Morgan’s support system in the Jamaican bureaucracy.  
Lynch arrested Morgan in April of 1672. The admiral departed Jamaica aboard the Royal 
Navy ship HMS Welcome. Despite his status as a prisoner, Morgan never saw the inside of a jail 
cell while in England.175 He spent two years touring London and visiting with family and friends. 
Throngs of English citizens followed his carriage wherever he went in the capital. Morgan was a 
celebrity not only to the English masses, but also to London’s upper class. He enjoyed audiences 
with the Lords of Trade, who commissioned him to write the King on how to improve Jamaica’s 
defenses. He even met with Charles II himself. Morgan was only a prisoner in the loosest sense 
of the word.176  
As Charles Burgess and David Cordingly also assert, it seems logical that Charles II’s 
actions against Morgan and Modyford were little more than an attempt to simultaneously 
appease Spanish officials and political opponents in England.177 Charles II’s policy of alliance 
with Spain was beyond unpopular in England. Even if the king had desired to take firm action 
against Modyford and Morgan, it would have amounted to political suicide. Morgan was, as 
Burgess claims, “a hero and potential martyr.”178 Additionally, Morgan’s raids poured 
tremendous amounts of money into English coffers. Official accounts estimate the haul from 
Morgan’s Panama raid at nearly £30,000. This was only half of the amount Morgan seized at 
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Portobello.179 Even to a monarch hoping to maintain strong relations with his Catholic allies, 
these sums of money could make diplomatic humiliation more palatable.  
For buccaneer leaders like Henry Morgan, attaching his labor to the English Crown 
produced a need to gain greater social and economic status. Morgan gained wealth, lands, and 
noble status for his service to the English Crown. While this was not the case for the rank and 
file members of his expeditions, Morgan’s meteoric rise to wealth and respectability from more 
humble origins represents many paths to social and economic mobility in the 17th century British 
Caribbean. Morgan received titles and political appointments because of his actions against the 
Spanish, but these official markers of class mobility did not guarantee him acceptance in the 
hearts and minds of Jamaica’s planter class.180 The fact that he held close association with 
members of Jamaica’s buccaneer community made it difficult for Morgan to fully assimilate into 
Jamaican high society. If Morgan now possessed a title of nobility and high political office, why 
would Jamaica’s planter class not accept him as one of their own? The answer lies not with 
Morgan himself, but in the type of people that Morgan brought to Jamaica.   
By 1690, Port Royal had gained the title “Sodom of the New World.”181 The city 
possessed more taverns per square mile than any other city on earth.182 In contrast, only six of 
Jamaica’s fifteen parishes had a church. Only four of these churches possessed clergy, one 
                                                           
179 Burgess, The Pirates’ Pact, 67. There is speculation that the actual haul from Panama was 
closer to £750,000.  
180 Lynch to Secretary Arlington, Sept. 23, 1674, Coventry Papers, LXXIV, 19. In Dunn, Sugar 
and Slaves, 157. 
181 Burgess, The Pirates’ Pact, 45.  
182 Burgess, The Pirates’ Pact, 45. 
58 
 
doubling as the only schoolmaster on the island.183 Lord Vaughn, the governor of Jamaica whom 
Morgan accompanied back to the island after receiving his knighthood, described Jamaica’s 
residents as those “who chose transporting rather than hanging and Jamaica rather than 
Tyborn.”184 Jamaica was the sort of place an individual came to make his fortune, not to enjoy it.  
While a sailor coming ashore in Port Royal may have seen architectural similarities 
between this city and any other in the English World, that is where the similarities stopped.185 
Port Royal was a town built for visitors, many of them less than welcomed by Jamaica’s elite 
residents. Its taverns and brothels attracted weary merchant and Royal Navy sailors, as well as 
buccaneers, and pirates. Port Royal’s merchants probably desired the latter two types of seamen 
above the former two because of their greater access to hard money.186  
Buccaneers may have not constituted Jamaica’s highest social class, but their presence 
supported the colony’s economy. In reference to his decision to issue letters of marque against 
the Spanish in 1666, Sir Thomas Modyford remarked, “His Lordship cannot imagine what a 
universal change there was on the face of the men and things.”187 The buccaneers brought 
economic prosperity to Jamaica. Their voyages fueled the island’s naval stores industries and 
their post-raid binges provided a market for the taverns, brothels, and other merchants in Port 
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Royal.188 However, their lifestyles were not compatible with the type of society Jamaica’s 
planter elite imagined for the island.  
Buccaneers practiced their belief in living a short life and a merry one. The festivities that 
buccaneers engaged in after a successful raid were the stuff of legends. Exquemelin describes 
some buccaneers as spending, “a good two or three thousand pieces of eight in a day-and next 
day not having a shirt to their back.”189 Exquemelin’s own master gained a reputation for buying 
a butt of wine, setting it in the middle of the street, and forcing at gunpoint all who passed by to 
drink with him. He tells of one Jamaican buccaneer paying “500 pieces of eight to a whore, just 
to see her naked.”190 This same lover of the female form later found himself indentured for his 
debts to one of his favorite drinking partners.191 These were not the types of individuals that 
Jamaican sugar planters wanted in their midst. A travel account by Ned Ward described the 
island as “the Dunghill of the Universe,” referring to its population of “prostitutes, convicts, and 
drunks.”192 In order to enter high society in Jamaica, Henry Morgan would have to overcome the 
fact that he was once a member of the Brethren of the Coast, a notorious buccaneer community. 
If Henry Morgan’s contemporaries subscribed to Wayne Lee’s argument that the way in 
which a group of people engaged in violence determined that group’s social and political 
legitimacy, entering the Jamaican planter elite would have been a nearly impossible task for 
                                                           
188 C.S.P Colonial Series, 1661-8, 1264, August 21, 1666. In Burgess, The Pirates’ Pact, 55. 
189 Exquemelin, The Buccaneers of America, 82. 
190 Exquemelin, The Buccaneers of America, 82. 
191 Exquemelin, The Buccaneers of America, 82.  
192 Edward Ward, A Trip to Jamaica: With a True Character of the People and Island (London, 
1700) 13, 15-16. In Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, 149. 
60 
 
Morgan. Port Royal’s brothels and taverns were not the only places that saw buccaneers engage 
in debauchery of epic proportion. Buccaneers carried their devil-may-care lifestyles with them 
on raids. Chapter One discussed the cruelty with which buccaneers treated their victims, but did 
not touch on the idea that this cruelty was not purely a part of a buccaneering business model. 
Many of the atrocities in which these raiders engaged were an integral part of the buccaneer 
lifestyle.  
During the Portobello raid, Morgan’s forces required the mayor of the town, along with 
several priests, friars, and nuns, to carry the siege ladders into place when they stormed 
Portobello’s final castle.193 It is easy to construe this event as a part of a plan to lessen the fort’s 
resistance, or minimize the amount of casualties taken during the assault. However, one should 
remember that Spanish forces in the Caribbean had resorted to cruel and extreme measures to 
remove buccaneer communities from Hispaniola and Tortuga. Forcing the Catholic clergy and 
town officials to place siege ladders may have been an exercise in 17th century risk management. 
Having Spanish clergy place siege ladders would either cause the Spanish to hold their fire to 
prevent killing their own, or the clergy would become cannon fodder instead of Morgan’s own 
men. This action could also have represented an attempt to repay the Spanish for years of 
persecuting buccaneer settlements.  
 Alexander Exquemelin also gives details of buccaneers under Morgan’s command 
participating in rape during the assaults on Panama and Portobello. It is certainly reasonable to 
assume that Morgan’s men may have engaged in such actions. However, it is important to 
remember that Exquemelin was a part of the French contingent in Morgan’s Panama raid. Many 
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parts of this contingent felt Morgan and the other English-speaking members of the company 
slighted the Frenchmen, cheating them out of their share of the plunder.194 Accusations of rape 
may have been just another case of Exquemelin attempting to besmirch Morgan’s name. He 
claims that after capturing Portobello the buccaneers, “began making merry, lording it with wine 
and women.”195 This statement certainly implies that Morgan’s men engaged in sexual 
misconduct with Portobello’s female population.  
While Exquemelin implied sexual misconduct at Portobello, he made explicit accusations 
of rape at Panama. He wrote, “Nor did they spare the women, except for those who yielded 
themselves completely… once a woman was in their hands they would work their will upon her, 
or beat her, starve her, or similarly torment her.”196 Not only did Exquemelin accuse Morgan’s 
men of rape at Panama, but he accused Morgan himself of engaging in lecherous behavior. He 
stated that “Morgan, being the general, should have set a better example, but he was no better 
than the rest.”197 Exquemelin goes on to give a detailed account of Morgan’s attempt to woo a 
married Spanish lady through every means possible. He accuses Morgan of trying to buy the 
lady’s affections by offering her better treatment than the other prisoners and by offering to 
return the goods stolen from her husband’s estate. Exquemelin wrote that when kind treatment 
failed, that Morgan beat and starved the woman. Exquemelin’s account mirrors accusations that 
the Spanish Governor of Panama leveled against Morgan in a complaint to the Spain’s 
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ambassador to England. These included “gang rape, infanticide, desecration of the Church, and 
the wanton torture and murder of clergy.”198 
 While Exquemelin and Spanish officials attempted to portray Morgan as a ruthless 
marauder, a few men from within Jamaica mounted a defense of Morgan’s honor. These 
included Dr. John Browne who assisted Morgan in contesting charges of rape. Browne claimed 
that “as to their women, I know nor heard of anything offered beyond their wills… as for the 
Admiral himself, he was noble enough to the vanquished enemy.”199 Beyond helping Morgan 
contest accusations of rape, Browne wrote to Lord Arlington describing Morgan as a 
“gentleman.”200 He also defended Morgan and Modyford’s decision to raid Portobello and 
Panama as a necessity of Jamaica’s security. He implored Lord Arlington to trust Morgan’s 
judgment in this matter stating, “I assure your Honor that no man whatever know better… the 
Spanish force, strength, or commerce.”201 This statement illustrates that many citizens of Jamaica 
supported Morgan and Modyford’s actions.  
 Beyond having allies London and in Jamaica, Henry Morgan had a friend in the highest 
of places. Despite Morgan’s role damaging royal policy with Spain, Charles II liked the hard-
drinking buccaneer. After ordering Morgan’s arrest, the King met with Morgan in his 
bedchamber. When Charles II asked Morgan if any Spanish officials had told him that Spain and 
England were at peace, Morgan declared that “If the governor or any of the Spanish officers had 
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told him that, he would never have believed them. The Spanish are nothing but liars.”202 After a 
tense moment, the King burst into laughter and exclaimed, “Oddfish!” and sent Morgan on his 
way. 203  
This unlikely ally would transform Morgan’s celebrity status into a gateway to titled 
nobility. Just three years after being hauled to London as the king’s prisoner, Henry Morgan 
became Sir Henry Morgan. As a buccaneer he had associated with the Brethren of the Coast, an 
anational group of seaborne raiders and cattle hunters. He had participated in three major raids 
against Spanish colonies during times of peace, and assisted a corrupt colonial governor make 
Port Royal a haven for nefarious characters.204 Henry Morgan was not the character one would 
imagine befriending the King of England, and gaining a title of nobility. He was the last person 
that one would think Charles II would give a high political office in Jamaica. However in 1674, 
Charles II knighted Henry Morgan and made him Lieutenant Governor of Jamaica.205  
Despite his knighthood and political position, Morgan left for Jamaica in March of 1675 
without having gained legitimacy in the eyes of Jamaica’s planter class.206 He was a popular hero 
in both Jamaica and England, and had charmed London’s high society during his three-year stay 
in the city. However, in Jamaica, the planter elite still considered him little better than a pirate. In 
a 1676 letter to Lord Vaughn, Secretary of State Coventry stated that, “the King intendeth to 
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make a Plantation of Jamaica and not a Christian Algiers.”207 Morgan and his buccaneer 
associates were not the sort with whom Jamaica’s planters wished to share their island. Morgan 
would spend the last years of his life straddling the line between his buccaneer past and his new 
role as a member of the titled nobility and Jamaica’s political elite.  
 While Morgan was a celebrity in Jamaica and England, the way in which he earned that 
status did not translate into social legitimacy. The planter elite in Jamaica considered him little 
better than a pirate. While he had accomplished some amazing military feats, and helped swell 
his majesty’s coffers, Morgan had acted very much like a pirate in accomplishing these feats. 
Although he carried a letter of marque, technically making him a privateer, his actions were not 
publicly approved by Charles II, only Sir Thomas Modyford.208 Morgan may have possessed the 
wealth, titles, and political power of a Jamaica’s elite class, but he was not yet a legitimate 
member of their circle.  
 Morgan’s raids on Portobello, Maracaibo, and Panama were brilliant military feats, but 
they were exercises in plunder. While privateers may not have faced the gallows for their 
actions, members of high society considered them little better than pirates. Sir Thomas Lynch, 
the biggest ally of the planter class, was appalled to find that Sir Henry Morgan was to be his 
replacement. He wrote in a letter to England’s secretary of state, “Here’s non, ever thought it 
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possible his Majesty should send the Admirall of the Pryvateers to governe this Island.”209 The 
planter class was unwilling to accept Morgan as one of their own, especially after reports of 
brutality and dishonesty on his voyages began to circulate. While Jamaica’s lower classes, and 
bureaucrats may have been comfortable with Morgan’s new status, the island’s highest levels of 
society did not.  
Having someone like Morgan hold high political office in Jamaica had brought what 
Jamaican planters considered the wrong sort of resident to the island. Wealthy and socially elite 
sugar planters did not want to reside in the “Sodom of the New World.”210 As Richard Dunn 
argues, sugar planters were no strangers to barbarous acts. They “exploited their black and Indian 
slaves more shamelessly than was possible with the unprivileged laboring class in Western 
Europe.”211 However cruelly planters may have treated their slaves and indentured servants, this 
type of exploitation represented a socially acceptable form of violence in the 17th century. Piracy 
did not.  
Morgan fought like a pirate, and looted like a pirate. While his letter of marque prevented 
him from hanging like a pirate, it did not gain him entrance into Jamaica’s elite planter class. As 
late as 1683, Sir Thomas Lynch would describe Sir Henry Morgan and his associates as “that 
little drunken silly party of Sir H. Morgan’s.”212 This statement was representative of many 
planters’ feelings about Morgan and his buccaneer companions. Gaining entrance into this class 
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would take years of political service and personal re-branding on Morgan’s part. Although he 
would never fully enter the ranks of Jamaica’s elite, Morgan would make tremendous inroads 
during his time as Lieutenant governor. Despite achieving great wealth and political power, 
Morgan’s reputation as a buccaneer would follow (and at times lead him) to his grave.213  
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CHAPTER THREE: A KNIGHT IN THE “SODOM OF THE NEW WORLD”214 
 
Upon his return to Jamaica, Sir Henry Morgan possessed a title of nobility, the rank of 
Admiral in the Royal Navy, and the position of Lieutenant Governor of Jamaica. Despite these 
titles, the Jamaican planter class did not accept him as part of Jamaica’s social elite. This was 
due to a number of factors, first among them, constant infighting between Jamaica’s planters and 
the buccaneers who used the island as a base of operations. Jamaica’s planters and buccaneers 
had two different ideas about the way in which the colony should develop. Planters wanted a 
stable settler colony like the English had established in Barbados. This would allow the sugar 
interest to establish large plantations with a stable labor force that was not subject to the 
distractions of the buccaneer lifestyle. 215  
The buccaneers, or privateers, as many called them by this point, wanted Port Royal to 
remain a haven for those who sought to raid the Spanish Empire. Under Governor Sir Thomas 
Modyford’s administration, they got their wish. Raids, such as those that Admiral Henry Morgan 
led, often sailed under letters of marque from Modyford’s Jamaican government. They recruited 
men in Port Royal’s taverns, and on Jamaica’s plantations.216 Many buccaneer leaders owned 
small plantations, yet most existed on the bottom rungs of Caribbean society. Although many 
buccaneer leaders owned small plantations, most buccaneers existed on the bottom rungs of 
Caribbean society. 217 Exquemelin shares an anecdote of a buccaneer paying five hundred pieces 
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of eight to a prostitute in a night of merry making, then having to indenture himself to a tavern 
owner within a week.218  
This incident illustrates the riches to rags existence of many buccaneers. The buccaneers 
(and particularly Sir Henry Morgan) practiced their beliefs in “a short life and a merry one.”219 
The buccaneer lifestyle was not compatible with the way Jamaica’s planters wanted the island to 
develop. These differences contributed to an unbridgeable gulf between the planter and 
buccaneer interests in mid to late 17th century Jamaican political and social life. Individuals who 
did not engage in buccaneering, or in the many businesses associated with buccaneering, sought 
to end the practice. Those who were actively involved in raiding the Spanish Main, and who 
profited indirectly from this practice, desired Jamaica to remain friendly to the buccaneers.  
Richard Dunn described Sir Henry Morgan as being the most famous of the Caribbean’s 
17th century residents, yet he likened this statement to declaring Al Capone the most famous 
American of the 20th century.220 This comparison clarifies the difficulties that Morgan 
experienced in becoming a part of Jamaica’s highest social class. Dunn sees economics as the 
source of “a bitter internecine struggle for control of the island.”221 He sees Morgan as the leader 
of one side of this struggle, and men like Sir Thomas Lynch as leading the other. Economic 
interests certainly represented a major point of contention in the struggle between planters and 
buccaneers over control of late 17th century Jamaica. However, social class and legitimacy were 
also key causes of this factional dispute. 
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Sugar planters that did not engage in buccaneering certainly had much to lose from those 
that engaged in raiding the Spanish Empire. The threat of violence between English and Spanish 
vessels severely curtailed opportunities, albeit illicit, for commerce between Jamaica and 
Spanish colonies. Bayamo, the same coastal town in Cuba where buccaneers captured Spanish 
turtle fisherman, stands as a prime example of this idea. Bayamo was a major hub of illicit trade 
between the English and Spanish from 1600 until nearly 1750. It is no coincidence that trade 
between the English and Spanish at Bayamo increased after Jamaica ceased being a major 
buccaneering haven in the 18th century. During the buccaneers’ heyday, the raiders would often 
take Spanish turtle fishermen prisoner off of this island to help supply meat for long voyages.222 
After the buccaneers ceased being a major force in the Caribbean, illicit trade between Bayamo 
and the English empire increased. Individuals who were not afraid of becoming prisoners aboard 
a buccaneering vessel were much more likely to engage in shady trade with outsiders.223 
 The decrease in privateering commissions issued after 1671 also contributed to the shift 
to a monoculture economy in Jamaica. Dunn points out that between 1671 and 1684, over forty 
Jamaican plantations switched from raising indigo, cacao, or provisions, to raising sugar while 
only two planters moved away from sugar cultivation.224 He attributes this dramatic shift toward 
sugar production to greater availability of labor. Dunn argues that an increase in available labor 
occurred due to the decrease in letters of marque issued by Jamaica’s government after 1671. He 
also argues that Jamaica imported an average of 1500 slaves per year during this period and that 
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most of this labor went to the sugar plantations.225 It is no coincidence that this dramatic shift in 
sugar planting occurred in the same year that buccaneering began to dwindle in Jamaica. With 
fewer opportunities to engage in legal raids against the Spanish, Jamaica’s buccaneer population 
began to drift toward employment ashore, or as pirates.  
What Dunn does not take into account is the fact that many individuals in Jamaica 
participated in buccaneering (or benefitted from the enterprise) while engaging in planting sugar. 
After his 1668 raid against Portobello, Sir Henry Morgan also purchased a large sugar plantation. 
He owned 122 slaves and two sugar estates in St. Mary Parish. Many of his buccaneering 
comrades owned small to medium-sized sugar estates. The buccaneers’ greatest patron, Sir 
Thomas Modyford, was also a major planter. He and his immediate family owned 22 parcels of 
land amounting to over 21,000 acres of Jamaican soil. Additionally, the Governor owned over 
400 slaves.226 By Dunn’s own reckoning, both Morgan and Modyford qualified as major sugar 
planters.227 This illustrates a significant overlap between the sugar interest and buccaneering 
interest.  
Although many buccaneers were also sugar planters, the two groups did not share the 
same economic concerns. This came about because of a 17th century version of de-gentrification. 
Dunn does acknowledges that the goal of many Jamaican planters was to leave the island and 
return to England as rich men. However, he attributes this to economic push factors as well as an 
inhospitable climate and rampant disease. An additional push factor causing Jamaica’s planters 
to leave the island in droves was the less than desirable buccaneer population that inhabited the 
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island’s capital. Many upper class Jamaicans did not wish to live in an island whose capital was 
known as the “Sodom of the New World.”228 Planters who engaged in buccaneering and those 
who did not had similar economic needs. They required a stable labor force, a secure market for 
their agricultural products, and military protection for their plantations.229 The buccaneers’ 
presence in Port Royal provided indirect security from foreign invasion, but challenged the 
planters’ labor market and their ability to engage in illicit trade with the Spanish Empire. 
Economics certainly represented important in an individual’s decision to oppose or support the 
buccaneering interest, but most Jamaicans based their political affiliations upon whether or not 
they personally participated in raiding the Spanish Empire.  
Sir Thomas Modyford’s alliance with the buccaneers, beginning in the 1660s, proved 
very profitable for the city’s merchants. However, these new inhabitants made Jamaica, an 
already difficult frontier land, an even less desirable place for the sugar planters to live. In 1670, 
John Style, a wealthy planter, commented that, “The number of tippling houses is now doubly 
increased.”230 These included, as the Bridenbaugh’s argued, “more than 100 licensed 
establishments, besides sugarworks and rum distilleries that sell without license.”231 While 
individuals like Sir Henry Morgan and his “drunken, silly party”232 may have rejoiced that the 
streets of Port Royal flowed with liquor, many planters shared Style’s misgivings about the way 
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Port Royal was developing. Individuals that supported the planter interest, like Lord Vaughn and 
Sir Thomas Lynch, also did not appreciate the way in which Port Royal was developing. They 
wanted to live in style rather than in city of brothels and barrooms.  
When Port Royal literally vanished into the sea following the devastating 1692 
earthquake, the London press marked the event as “a Dreadful Warning to the Sleepy World: Or, 
God’s heavy judgments shewed on a Sinful People.”233 John Pike, a Jamaican Quaker wrote a 
letter home to his brother saying, “Great men who were so swallowed up with pride, that a man 
could not be admitted to speak with them, and women whose top-knots seemed to reach the 
clouds, now lie stinking upon the water, and are made meat for fish and fowls of the air.”234 
Statements such as these illustrate the contempt with which many Englishmen, in Europe and in 
the Caribbean, viewed Port Royal. Religious men like Pike equated Port Royal’s destruction as 
divine retribution against the new Sodom. Just as God had destroyed the original Sodom in 
Genesis, he had reached down and smote Port Royal.235  
To many observers, Port Royal had received its just fate. The response to Port Royal’s 
destruction throughout the English Empire makes it easier to understand Henry Morgan’s 
difficulties in entering Jamaica’s upper social class. Although Morgan had little to do with the 
physical design of Port Royal, he and Sir Thomas Modyford were the co-architects of the city’s 
soul (or lack thereof). Modyford’s tombstone reads, “Mistake not, reader For hear not only lies 
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the body of Sir Thomas Modyford, but the life and soul of all Jamaica!”236 The pair had brought 
the buccaneers, whose pockets overflowed with Spanish gold, to Port Royal. The city’s brothels 
and taverns followed shortly, hoping to turn a tidy profit by meeting the needs of weary 
buccaneers. In essence, Morgan was responsible for building a new Sodom on the shores of 
Jamaica. Peter Earle described Jamaica’s planter class as believing that Morgan’s comrades 
“were pirates and should be hanged.”237 The island’s upper class held Morgan responsible for 
bringing the buccaneers to Port Royal and were not comfortable admitting such a man into their 
ranks.  
The Bridenbaughs argue that after 1672, “the little port owed its riches not so much to 
pirates’ plunder as to the far-from-glamorous island staples and the heavy traffic in slaves.”238 
Port Royal’s riches may have been a byproduct of the sugar interest, but Port Royal’s spirit was 
that of a buccaneer port. If Modyford represented the “soule of Jamaica” 239 then Port Royal 
certainly was a buccaneer port. No governor had done more to entice the buccaneers to Jamaica 
than Modyford. Buccaneering and the alliance between Jamaica’s buccaneer community and 
Modyford’s colonial government reached its high point with Morgan’s Panama raid. However, 
the sharp decline in privateering commissions from Jamaica’s government after 1671 did not 
mean that the buccaneers inhabiting Port Royal immediately stopped looting and became happy 
freeholders and merchant seamen. These men continued to raid Spanish shipping with or without 
a letter of marque. Sir Henry Morgan himself ordered a number of executions for piracy during 
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his time as Lieutenant Governor and as acting governor (1674-1687).240 These executions did not 
mark a return to law and order for members of Port Royal’s less than legitimate inhabitants. 
They merely expressed a desire by the Crown, and many members of Jamaica’s civil government 
to curtail the buccaneering community. Members of the buccaneering faction, Modyford, 
Morgan, and Albemarle saw buccaneering as an avenue to riches and security for Jamaica. 
Lynch, Vaughn and the planter faction saw the situation differently. They saw the buccaneers as 
an unnecessary nuisance and an obstacle to Jamaica becoming a stable settler colony like 
Barbados.  
John Taylor, a visitor to Jamaica, gave an in-depth description of Port Royal in 1690. His 
travel account describes the city’s architecture, businesses, and its commercial activities. Taylor 
remarked that “lodgings are here very deare, so that you must give six [Spanish] Dollars a Month 
for one Chamber reasonably furnished.”241 In Francis Hanson’s 1682 description of Port Royal, 
he called the city, “The storehouse or treasury of the West Indies.” He also remarked that, “bars 
and cakes of gold, wedges and pigs of silver, pistols, piece of eight [and] wrought plate” 
circulated with frequency in the city. Taylor’s describes Port Royal as a city filled with hard 
specie, but only the Spanish possessed gold and silver in large quantities. Taylor even gave the 
price of his lodging in Spanish currency, indicating that Spanish currency circulated freely in 
Port Royal. The amount of gold and silver in circulation on Jamaica in 1690 reflects a society 
that built a significant portion of its economy around raiding the Spanish Empire with or without 
sanction.  
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This had profound effects on Jamaica’s seafaring community. Many members of 
Jamaica’s buccaneering community had transformed from buccaneers, to privateers, to outright 
pirates in the years that Henry Morgan resided in the Caribbean. These individuals now raided 
the Spanish Empire without a letter of marque, as many did before coming to Jamaica, but now 
they had no connection to the cow-hunting and naval stores industries that formed the basis of 
buccaneer societies. Additionally, Jamaica’s population of seaborne raiders now resided in an 
English settler colony. This destroyed the buccaneers’ anational identities. Unsanctioned raids by 
members of an anational buccaneer community did not trouble the English in Jamaica, but when 
buccaneers made an alliance with the Jamaican colonial government, they traded their anational 
identities for letters of marque and steady markets for their plunder. These securities had a price, 
however. Associating with the English Empire destroyed the middle ground between privateer 
and outright pirate that buccaneers occupied for most of the 17th century.  
By becoming subjects of a colonial power, buccaneers resigned themselves to following 
that power’s lead in hostility or alliance with Spain. Residing in an English settler colony 
Imperial alliance meant that the English government in Jamaica would consider individuals that 
did not refrain from raiding Spanish shipping and settlements as pirates rather than buccaneers. 
For the average crewman, this mattered little. Be they buccaneers or outright pirates, they would 
still hang for piracy if Spanish authorities caught them.242 Nor did rank and file buccaneers 
possess the wealth necessary to enter high society in English settler colonies. However, the 
buccaneer’s journey from sea rover to pirate caused a problem for Sir Henry Morgan and his 
attempted rise to social legitimacy. Since the buccaneers were no longer anational, but identified 
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as part of the English Empire, many members of Jamaica’s upper class saw him not as the man 
who tamed the buccaneers. The planters would later attack Morgan for his pirate-like qualities 
and for bringing an undesired element into Port Royal. Jamaica’s large planters did not care for 
the buccaneers when they kept headquarters on Tortuga and Hispaniola, or when they operated 
under letters of marque. Planters became even less tolerant of the buccaneer community when 
Morgan and his new ally, Governor Christopher Monck, used an armed gang to insure that pro-
buccaneer forces dominated the Jamaican parliamentary elections in 1688.243 As Dunn argues, 
the planter class began “retiring en masse to England in disgust”244 after this action. Although 
Jamaica’s planters would eventually dominate the island’s politics, they would do so as absentee 
owners.245 Morgan would never formally enter their ranks or achieve any type of legitimacy in 
their eyes as long as he lived. Planter supporters like Sir Thomas Lynch and Lord Vaughn would 
refer to him as “silly”246 and “unreconstructed.”247 Morgan acted in a manner that individuals 
like Vaughn and Lynch thought to be unbecoming of a public officer.  
Morgan and Monck were “boon companions”248 from the very beginning of their short 
relationship. Dunn describes Monck as “a profligate and irresponsible man.”249 He and Morgan 
both developed a fascination with treasure hunting after one of Monck’s ships found a sunken 
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Spanish galleon worth £50,000 off the coast of Hispaniola. Unfortunately for the buccaneering 
interest, both Morgan and Monck would die of alcohol induced ailments in 1688 before they 
could influence the island’s policy in favor of the buccaneers.250  
Defending his honor against accusations that he was a pirate had been a constant struggle 
for Henry Morgan and his supporters since his earliest raids as an English privateer in the 1660s. 
The Spanish had always considered him a pirate. In a letter to Moran during the Portobello raid, 
Don Augustin de Bracamonte, the President of Panama, wrote to Morgan, “I take you to be a 
corsair and I reply that the vassals of the King of Spain do not make treaties with inferior 
persons.”251 To this Morgan answered, “your letter does not deserve a reply, since you call me a 
corsair.”252 During his arrest in London, Major General Bannister, commander of Jamaica’s land 
forces wrote to Lord Arlington on Morgan’s behalf. He described Morgan as “a very well 
deserving person, and one of great courage.”253 These were not the words Bannister would have 
used to describe a pirate. 
After Morgan’s knighthood and return to Jamaica in 1674, the direct accusations of 
piracy largely abated. Replacing them were remarks about his appearance and his fondness for 
prostitutes, gambling, and drinking.254 Morgan’s political opponents dared not accuse a well-
connected and titled man like Morgan of piracy. Rather, they attempted to brand him as a pirate 
based on his lifestyle. During his second term as Governor, Sir Thomas Lynch described 
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Morgan’s lifestyle as a series of “debauches which go on every night.”255 Lynch commented that 
“In his drink, Sir Henry reflects on the government, swears, damns and curses most 
extravagantly.”256 While heavy drinking, gambling, and sexual promiscuity were not exclusively 
the pursuits of pirates, Morgan’s contemporaries associated them with the pirate lifestyle. 
Deriding Morgan for his lifestyle may have not been a direct accusation of piracy, however those 
who made derogatory statements about Morgan’s habits did so to label Morgan as a pirate in the 
spirit of the law, if not by its letter.  
A prime example of these new attacks came in 1676 when Governor Vaughn decided to 
attempt to try Sir Henry Morgan in Jamaican court under charges of “financing privateering 
voyages, granting illegal commissions, and engaging in secret deals with the French government 
on Tortuga.”257 The crux of Vaughn’s objection to Morgan as Lieutenant Governor was that 
Morgan acted like a pirate, and supported the buccaneering interest through means both fair and 
foul. The way in which Morgan contested these charges illustrates that they were not, at their 
core, charges of government corruption or treason, but thinly veiled accusations of piracy. 
Morgan appeared in court “dressed immaculately in the garb of an admiral of the fleet.”258 He 
did not deny the charges against him, but dismissed his actions as necessary for the security of 
Jamaica. Pirates did not wear the trappings of an English admiral. Nor did they receive 
knighthood for services to their sovereign. Morgan understood the nature of the charges against 
him, and answered them accordingly. A jury acquitted Morgan and his brother in law (accused of 
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being a co-conspirator) to the sound of cheers from the gallery. Importantly, those attending the 
trial represented a wide cross-section of Jamaican society. The men of the jury were all 
gentlemen of standing in the island, but the gallery was comprised of individuals from the all 
classes.259 
In addition to defending his honor against accusations of piracy, a number of individuals 
attacked Morgan based on the circumstances under which Morgan entered the Caribbean. Most 
famous among these individuals was Alexander Exquemelin, the author of The Buccaneers of 
America. Exquemelin’s work leveled a number of attacks against Morgan. The narrative claims 
that Morgan was guilty of a number of atrocities, including rape, infanticide, torture, and 
desecration of churches during his raids against Portobello, Maracaibo, and Panama. Perhaps 
most damaging to Morgan’s good name was the accusation that Morgan had entered the 
Caribbean as an indentured servant. This was a complete falsehood. Most historians agree that 
Morgan was born to a farming family in Wales in the 1630s, and entered the Caribbean as part of 
an expedition launched by General William Penn and Admiral Robert Venables.260 In 1685, 
Morgan would sue Thomas Malthus, one of the publishers of Exquemelin’s work, for libel.  
William Crooke, another of Exquemelin’s publishers, was not mentioned in the suit and 
settled out of court, agreeing to print a retraction. The settlement that Morgan reached with 
Crooke, and the judgment against Malthus each speak volumes about Morgan’s motives in 
protecting his good name. In the complaint against Malthus, John Greene, Morgan’s attorney in 
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London, requested £10,000 damages. Morgan only received a judgment of £200 in damages plus 
expenses from Malthus.261 At the coram rege hearing, Green offered an interesting defense of the 
Morgan family, arguing that,  
against all evil deeds, piracies, etc., [the Morgan family] had the 
abhorrence and disgust, and that in the West Indies thaere are such thieves 
pirates, called ‘buccaneers,’ who subsist by piracy, depredation and evil 
all kinds without lawful authority, that of these people Henry Morgan 
and still has hatred.262  
 
Greene’s defense described quite a different Henry Morgan from the one who claimed to “abhor 
bloodshed”263 after reluctantly hanging three convicted pirates. It also failed to note that 
Morgan’s carried the title admiral of buccaneers. This was an intriguing title for a man who 
claimed hatred for the group.  
 Although Morgan won the case against Malthus, the court did not require the publisher to 
print a retraction. Malthus did not do so, and never printed another version of Exquemelin’s 
work.264 Crooke, on the other hand, settled with Morgan out of court. He printed an apology 
immediately following his settlement with Morgan. In future editions of Exquemelin, Crooke 
included an introduction that gave specific page numbers where he believed Exquemelin to be in 
error. Crooke’s introduction also claimed that he, “never had in mind, the least intention or 
design, either of reflecting, or aspersing of him, or any other Person whatsoever, named in that 
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history.”265 The language of Crooke’s retraction and the introduction shows that he had the 
utmost respect for Morgan and his “heroik actions.”266 
The fact that Morgan did not pursue damages against Crooke, who printed a retraction, 
illustrates that Morgan was not interested in financial compensation, but in having Exquemelin’s 
publishers retract the libelous statements and having a court of law refute Exquemelin’s claim 
that Morgan was once an indentured servant. Charles Hatton wrote that after Morgan’s lawsuit, 
“History of ye Buccaneers wase looked upon as fabulous and sold for noe more then wast 
paper.”267 While Morgan’s libel suit may have vindicated his good name in the 17th century, 
Hatton’s assertion was a gross overstatement. The first English editions of Exquemelin’s libelous 
work continue to circulate to this day and were readily available when Hatton wrote of their 
worthlessness.  
In 1695, William Whitwood and Anthony Feldham published an exact copy of Crooke’s 
second edition without his introduction. This gave their readers no indication that Crooke had 
retracted certain passages. As David Cordingly points out, “earlier editions continued to circulate 
are still quoted today in many histories of piracy.”268 It is not certain if Whitwood and Feldham 
were truly ignorant of Morgan’s libel suit, or if they merely felt safe from prosecution because 
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Morgan had died in 1688.269 For Morgan’s part, he flatly denied Exquemelin’s accusations, 
saying that he “never was a servant to anyone in his life, unless to his Majesty.”270 Even when 
defending himself against accusations that had nothing to do with piracy, Morgan felt the need to 
structure his defense in terms that reflected his actions against the Spanish as service to the 
English Crown rather than piracy.   
Another marker of low status plagued Morgan throughout his life. The man who planned 
the brilliant assaults on Portobello, Maracaibo, and Panama gained celebrity status in Jamaica 
and England, and charmed Charles II himself was functionally illiterate. In a letter to his friend 
Sir Leoline Jenkins, Morgan admitted “I have been much more used to the pike than the 
book.”271 When discussing Morgan’s 1676 trial for treason, David Burgess remarked that, 
“Evidence was almost embarrassingly easy to obtain. Morgan cheerfully signed his name to all 
manner of dubious documents; one sometimes gets the impression he never read them.”272 Sir 
Henry Morgan was a man out of his league. While he may have had the trappings of Jamaican 
high society: title, wealth, and political power, he did not fit in this circle.  
On August 25, 1688, the man that David Cordingly referred to as “the greatest of the 
buccaneers”273 died. As Cordingly notes, a number of important individuals in Jamaica paid 
homage to the swashbuckler’s premature (if self-inflicted) demise. The Duke of Albemarle, 
governor of Jamaica and Morgan’s longtime patron, ordered that Morgan receive a state funeral. 
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The captain of HMS Assistance, a royal navy frigate moored in Port Royal noted Morgan’s death 
in the ship’s log. After Morgan’s funeral, HMS Assistance and HMS Drake both fired salutes 
honoring Morgan. Port Royal’s harbor battery, named after Morgan,274 and the guns of every 
merchant vessel in the city soon joined Drake and Assistance in bidding farewell to Jamaica’s 
most infamous resident.275 This exemplifies the degree to which Morgan had earned the 
admiration of both Jamaica’s upper and lower classes. For the seafaring men of Port Royal, 
Morgan’s death marked the end of an era. His meteoric rise to wealth, high political office, and 
titled nobility was the standard to which many buccaneers aspired. It is fitting that HMS Drake 
was one of the ships that fired a salute honoring Morgan’s after his funeral. Morgan was the 
successor to Sir Francis Drake’s legacy of plundering the Spanish Empire in the Caribbean to 
climb the English Empire’s social, political, and economic ladders. To the rank and file 
buccaneer, and many small Jamaican planters, Sir Henry Morgan’s life represented the 
opportunities (limited as they may have been) for political, social, and economic mobility that 
the Caribbean made available to individuals of all classes.  
Morgan achieved greater social acceptance in death than during his life. As his body lay 
in state at the King’s house in Port Royal, many of Jamaica’s upper class paid homage to him. 
His funeral took place at St. Peters Church, a building to which Morgan had been a major 
benefactor.276 This was not the funeral of a pirate, nor final the sendoff of a buccaneer. In death, 
Sir Henry Morgan found his place as an English knight, an admiral of the Royal Navy, and a 
major player in Jamaican politics.  
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 Within four years of Morgan’s passing, Jamaica would lose most of its buccaneer 
identity. Morgan and Albemarle’s deaths in 1688, the lobbying efforts of absentee planters at 
Whitehall, and the disastrous 1692 earthquake that destroyed Port Royal served to turn Jamaica 
into England’s premier sugar colony. As Richard Dunn argues, “When the buccaneers’ 
playground literally vanished in 1692, no one could doubt that sugar was king.”277 Opportunities 
for social and economic mobility in the Caribbean would vanish along with the buccaneer 
lifestyle. The vast majority of individuals with major estates in Jamaica during the 18th century 
got their start on the island within the first decade of English settlement. Dunn describes 
individuals who staked claims on the island in the 1670s as “relative latecomers.” 278 Those who 
did come to Jamaica after 1692, largely did so against their will. Just as slaves constituted the 
majority of immigrants to the Caribbean during this period, absentee planters constituted most of 
the land-owning class. The opportunity to advance oneself “beyond the line”279 disappeared with 
the city of Port Royal.  
 As for the buccaneers, they would scatter to the winds. Many French-speaking 
buccaneers would return to Hispaniola and Tortuga and continue their actions under the French 
government’s protection. Others would work as crewmen aboard English merchant vessels. 
Many would continue to raid Spanish shipping as just as they had in the past, only now without 
the protections and veil of legitimacy that a letter of marque provided. These individuals would 
form the ranks of pirates during what Marcus Rediker called the second generation of piracy’s 
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“golden age.”280 Rediker refers to Morgan’s generation (the first of the golden age) as that of the 
“Protestant Sea Dogs,”281 and remarks that profit, Protestantism, and the pirate lifestyle may 
have motivated men like Morgan, but that they acted, at least in the guise of nationalism. This 
was not the case for the second generation of pirates in the golden age. This multi-ethnic group 
of raiders typically showed no preference to what nation’s shipping they raided. Furthermore, the 
second generation of piracy during the golden age owed its existence to the triumph of the sugar 
interest in Jamaica over the buccaneers.  
 Just as Jamaican governor Thomas D’Oyley feared in 1661, eliminating letters of marque 
merely pushed the buccaneers into outright piracy and gave them no reason to spare English 
ships from their raids. As in D’Oyley’s time, the decision to enforce peace with Spain “enraged 
the populacy”282 and caused many men to go on the account.283 In 1722, Royal Navy surgeon 
John Atkins described the transition from privateer to pirate as going from “plundering for 
others, to do[ing] it for themselves.”284 This was precisely the case in the Caribbean after Port 
Royal ceased being a haven for the buccaneers. Once the ability for social and economic 
mobility through privateering ventures against the Spanish Empire disappeared, individuals who 
had “lived solely on spoil and depredations” began to raid shipping bearing any flag. The 
“queen’s pirates”285 of the Elizabethan Era would be replaced by the “villains of all nations”286 
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that would dominate the golden age of piracy. Sir Henry Morgan did not live to see the full 
extent of this transformation, but it had profound effects upon his life and attempts at social 
mobility. Engaging in raids against the Spanish Empire catapulted Henry Morgan to high 
political office and a title of nobility. However, these fact that the individuals who participated in 
those raids later became pirates prevented Morgan from fully integrating into Jamaica’s planter 
class.  
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EPILOGUE: ENJOY HISTORY RESPONSIBLY 
 
During his lifetime, Sir Henry Morgan used carefully orchestrated acts of violence to 
climb the English social, political, and economic ladder. His raids against the Spanish Main 
helped bring a large buccaneer community into the English Empire. While his later life was less 
bloody than his time as a buccaneer and privateer, it was no less combative. Jamaican sugar 
planters replaced Spanish soldiers and sailors as Morgan’s primary enemies, and attempts at 
character assassination took the place of direct attempts on his life. The man Dudley Pope 
referred to as “the buccaneer king”287 was out of his element as a knight in Jamaica. Although 
Morgan had the physical and legal trappings of Jamaica’s planter aristocracy, he did not truly 
belong to this group. Morgan’s formal title of nobility, sizeable land holdings, and high political 
offices meant little to a group of people who considered him responsible for Port Royal’s seedy 
reputation.  
Despite Morgan’s strained relationship with Jamaica’s planters, it is important to 
remember that the former buccaneer made great strides in economic, social, and political 
mobility. His innovative actions against the Spanish Empire branded Morgan a national icon. 
Even while officially being under arrest, Morgan toured London as a celebrity. The English 
capital’s upper and lower classes, and even Charles II himself, treated Morgan as a conquering 
hero. Morgan’s reception in London was not a quickly passing curiosity, but a two-year 
outpouring of popular support that culminated in his knighthood. Although Morgan did not 
achieve the levels of social mobility that he desired, his represents the opportunities for social, 
political, and economic advancement that life in the 17th century Caribbean offered individuals 
of all classes.  
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It is important to understand the ways in which Henry Morgan’s life illustrates social 
mobility in the seventeenth-century Caribbean largely because of the way today’s popular culture 
portrays Morgan. Most people first meet Sir Henry Morgan through the brands of rum that bear 
his name. The fact that the Captain Morgan Facebook page has over 5 million likes illustrates 
this point beautifully. The 5 million individuals who liked the Captain Morgan Facebook page 
are only a fraction of those who view television commercials for the brand, or are exposed to 
Captain Morgan advertising through print media. However, the Henry Morgan on the rum bottle 
is a very different individual from Sir Henry Morgan, Admiral of Buccaneers, and lieutenant 
governor of Jamaica. The actor who portrays Henry Morgan in the television commercials for 
Captain Morgan rum, more closely resembles Keith Richards’ portrayal of Captain Teague in 
Disney’s Pirates of the Caribbean or Captain Hook than he does the available drawings of the 
real Henry Morgan.288 Captain Morgan rum’s brand identity has worked to transform Sir Henry 
Morgan, lieutenant governor of Jamaica, into a human trademark. Not only has this advertising 
campaign demoted Sir Henry Morgan from admiral to captain, but from privateer to pirate. 
Morgan’s visage presented in Captain Morgan’s various advertising campaigns conjures images 
of Morgan’s life as a buccaneer, not as the English gentleman that he envisioned himself.  
These perceptions are not entirely inaccurate. During the first part of Morgan’s life in the 
Caribbean, he represented the stereotypical swashbuckling buccaneer. Despite this, the image of 
Morgan that may be seen pasted on millions of rum bottles across the world do not bring their 
subject’s story to its conclusion. Morgan saw his life as a buccaneer and a privateer as a way to 
achieve elevated economic and social status. He looted and pillaged Spanish cities and shipping 
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in an effort to transform himself into a respectable member of Jamaican society, not as an 
expression of his preferred lifestyle. Sir Henry Morgan was not merely a charismatic buccaneer 
living the short and merry life of a pirate. He was a 17th century social climber who used his 
ability to lead innovative military campaigns against the Spanish Empire to achieve high political 
office, ownership of a sugar plantation, and a title of nobility.  
While it is an effective method by which to sell liquor, Captain Morgan brand’s portrayal 
of Henry Morgan paints an incomplete picture of its subject, and of the 17th century Caribbean’s 
porous social culture. These campaigns portray Morgan as a stereotypical pirate, when in reality, 
he was a buccaneer or a privateer depending on what part of his life one examines. Captain 
Morgan’s commercials depict Henry Morgan as hard-drinking, womanizing, and living outside 
the rules of polite society. All of these statements could be applied to the real Morgan. However, 
what the commercials do not divulge is the fact that after the sack of Panama, Morgan’s acts of 
violence and pillage led to his appointment to the English nobility, and to high political office in 
Jamaica. After his most famous triumph, Morgan ceased leading raids against the Spanish. He no 
longer needed to participate directly in the loosely sanctioned acts of violence that granted him 
social mobility. Morgan’s exploits gained him entrance to the English nobility, a vast fortune, 
and high political office. After completing his climb up the social ladder, Morgan hung up his 
sword and pistols, but not his liquor, and left behind the swashbuckling lifestyle of a buccaneer.   
It is ironic that Morgan’s name is famous today because of his pirate-like tendencies, 
drinking, womanizing, and bold dress, when he followed this lifestyle in order to obtain upward 
social mobility. Popular culture obscures the fact that Sir Henry Morgan was a member of the 
English nobility, and held high political office. Acts of violence at sea and on land were not 
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Morgan’s preferred lifestyle, but merely a vehicle for social, economic and political mobility in a 
world “beyond the line.”289  
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